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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
We attempt to replicate the duties of financial analysts by performing 
accounting and financial analyses for Enron, using information contained 
in the firm's Security and Exchange Commission filings and in annual 
and quarterly reports that were available to analysts prior to the firm's 
collapse. We focus on Enron accounting policies, estimates, and financial 
measures that reflect the key risk areas that we identified in our strategy 
analysis. 
Given that the purpose of accounting analysis is to evaluate the degree 
finn'sto which a rm  accounting system captures its underlying economic 
reality, we attempt to assess the degree of distortion in Enron's reported 
numbers, based on our comfort level with management's choice of ac­
counting policies and estimates. The purpose of our financial analysis is 
finnto assess the performance of the rm after its efforts to negate the effects 
of perceived distortions in the reported numbers. We ask, and attempt to 
answer, the question of whether financial analysts should have seen warn­
ing signs of Enron's collapse and should have warned investors of the 
firm's precarious financial situation long before the unfortunate event sur­
prised stockholders and creditors alike. 
Our detailed analyses show that from 1997 onward there was evidence 
of reporting and performance problems. We highlight areas ofmajor con­
cern about profitability and debt levels. 
infonnationAlthough Enron managementmakes an abundance of rm avail­
able to analysts, the language is not always clear; it is confusing even to 
accounting experts. The vast amount of information makes the analyst's 
sepa­job time consuming and tedious, yet essential information, such as 
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also had complex ownership arrangements with many other companies and 
partnerships. These investments and ownership arrangements may have put a 
strain on the firm's capital budgeting and capital management systems. 
We now use the conclusions reached in our strategy analysis to investigate 
Enron's accounting and financial information, in order to evaluate its financial 
performance and determine whether the firm's accounting and financial policies 
made sense. We believe that most financial analysts should have seen red flags 
and warned investors of the company's shaky financial situation. In this regard, 
we highlight actionable danger signals apparent in the financial statements and 
mandated Securities and Exchange Commission filings, signals that analysts 
should have recognized, identified, and warned stakeholders about. 
ACCOUNTING ANALYSIS 
Overview of Accounting Analysis 
The purpose of accounting analysis is to evaluate the degree to which a 
firm's accounting system captures its underlying economic reality, given in­
herent management biases and the substantial accounting flexibility that man­
agement is empowered with (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-1). For this purpose we use 
Enron's precollapse publicly available and externally audited income state­
ments, balance sheets, statements of cash flows, notes to the financial statements, 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) reports, and independent audi­
tor reports. We supplement this with other information that was readily avail­
able to analysts. 
For each financial statement account category-assets, liabilities, sharehold­
ers' equity, revenues, and expenses-we use our knowledge ofthe firm's profit 
drivers and risk factors to identify key areas of accounting flexibility, bearing 
in mind that there are strong relations between the various categories (for ex­
ample, revenue recognition policies directly impact assets). We evaluate the 
appropriateness of the accounting policies and estimates chosen by manage­
ment, and we attempt to assess the degree of distortion in reported numbers. 
Where possible, we attempt to negate the effect of perceived distortions in 
reported numbers by using cash flow numbers, disclosures made in the notes 
to the financial statements, and qualified opinions given by the external audi­
tors. This provides us a springboard from which to launch into financial analysis, 
using our own adjusted numbers (if deemed necessary) to improve the reli­
ability of our financial analysis calculations (see Palepu et al. 2000, 3-1). 
Another important part of accounting analysis is to demarcate the bound­
aries of the business by looking beyond the legal definitions that normally 
COntrol financial reporting. As analysts, we should be far more concerned with 
eConomic substance than with legal form. We want to know what resources 
the firm controls, a much broader focus than the narrowly defined legal form 
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rateratedisclosuresdisclosures ofunrealizedunrealizedgainsgainsof onontradingtradingactivities,activ ties,isisnotnotavailable.available. 
ThisThisdoesdoesnot,not,however,however,excuseexcuseanalystsanalystswhowhooverwhelminglyoverwhelminglywouldwouldnotnot 
sees ethethewoodsw odsforforthethetrees,tr es,andandwhowhocontinuedcontinuedrecommendingrecommendingtotoclientsclients 
orthatthattheytheybuybuy orholdholdEnronEnronstock.stock. 
OurOurinvestigationinvestigationshowsshowsthatthatthetheredredflagsflagswerewereplentifulplentifulandandthatthatthethe 
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INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION 
TheThe strategystrategy analysisanalysis inin thethe previousprevious chapterchapterallowsa lowsusus toto focusfocus ononEnron'sEnron's 
relatedrelatedkeykey riskriskareasareas forfor accountingaccounting analysisanalysispurposes.purposes.TheThefirstfirstwaswas thethefi­fi­
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Enron's'  precollapser ll s  performance,rf r , 
The sustainability  of  Enron's'  business model is  based on its ability to create and ex­
ploit markets, whether they be in energy, bandwidth, freighter capacity, data storage or 
toilet paper. Its profit potential declines as a function of  the rate at which the markets 
mature.... markets mature very quickly these days thanks to the increased sophistica­
tion and variety of risk management products and services and speed of information 
flows that enhance trading liquidity. (Wasden, Ayers, and Arias 200 I,1, 6-7) 
These analysts (whose opinion differed markedly from most of their peers) 
succinctly concluded that Enron's earnings could suffer from the very market 
efficiency thatt  thet  firm had helpedl  tot  unleash.l . 
The second riskri  arear  concerned thet  maintenancei t  off investori t confidencefi and 
accessss tot  financingfi i  resources.r s r s. Thisi  riskris  arear  became especiallys i ll  importanti rt t fromfr  
19991  onward.on ar . Management'sanage ent's self-declaredself- ecl r  intensei te s  focusf s on earningse r i  perr shares r  
ledle  tot  qualityqualit  off earningsearni s anda  incomeinc e managementanage ent concerns.concerns. InIn addition,additi , man­a ­
agement'sage ent's emphasise phasis onon thet e continuedcontinue  accessaccess tot  financingfi a ci  resourcesresources providedprovided 
strongstrong motivationotivation toto manageanage ratiosratios stipulatedstipulated inin debtdebt covenants.covenants. 
AA thirdthird riskrisk areaarea isis thethe financialfinancial successsuccess ofof internationalinternational high-risk,high-risk, hard­hard­
assetasset venturesventures andand complexco plex partnershippartnership andand equityequity ownershipownership structures.structures. In­In­
vestmentsvest ents inin thesethese venturesventures andand entitiesentities contradictedcontradicted management'smanage ent's apparentapparent 
newnew asset-lightas et-light philosophy.philosophy. ExamplesExamples includedincluded investmentsinvestments inin thethe litigation­litigation­
rackedracked DabholDabhol powerpower plantplant projectproject inin IndiaIndia andand waterwater plantsplants inin England.England. EnroEnronn 
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rate disclosures of unrealized gains on trading activities, is not available. 
This does not, however, excuse analysts who overwhelmingly would not 
see the woods for the trees, and who continued recommending to clients 
that they buy or hold Enron stock. 
Our investigation shows that the red flags were plentiful and that the 
situation was aggravated by the incidents of apparent disdain (reported in 
the news media) with which Enron's top management dealt with financial 
analysts. The results of our accounting and financial analyses raise issues 
about the competence, independence, and objectivity of analysts who con­
tinued to recommend this stock. 
INTRODUCTION 
The strategy analysis in the previous chapter allows us to focus on Enron's 
related key risk areas for accounting analysis purposes. The first was the fi­
nancial success ofits dealer and trading activities. This risk factor stems from 
Enron's move away from its successful low-risk core energy businesses into 
high-risk dealer and trading activities, including broadband and derivatives 
(the specifics of which cannot clearly be identified from strategy disclosures 
in public filings). The move put the firm at increased risk into new and ill­
defined business operations. According to a group of analysts who questioned 
Enron's precollapse performance, 
The sustainability of Enron's business model is based on its ability to create and ex­
ploit markets, whether they be in energy, bandwidth, freighter capacity, data storage or 
toilet paper. Its profit potential declines as a function of the rate at which the markets 
mature.... markets mature very quickly these days thanks to the increased sophistica­
tion and variety of risk management products and services and speed of information 
flows that enhance trading liquidity. (Wasden, Ayers, and Arias 200 1, 6-7) 
These analysts (whose opinion differed markedly from most of their peers) 
succinctly concluded that Enron's earnings could suffer from the very market 
efficiency that the firm had helped to unleash. 
The second risk area concerned the maintenance ofinvestor confidence and 
access to financing resources. This risk area became especially important from 
1999 onward. Management's self-declared intense focus on earnings per share 
led to quality of earnings and income management concerns. In addition, man­
agement's emphasis on the continued access to financing resources provided 
strong motivation to manage ratios stipulated in debt covenants. 
A third risk area is the financial success of international high-risk, hard­
asset ventures and complex partnership and equity ownership structures. In­
vestments in these ventures and entities contradicted management's apparent 
new asset-light philosophy. Examples included investments in the litigation­
racked Dabhol power plant project in India and water plants in England. Enron 
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alsol  had complex ownership arrangements with many other companies and 
partnerships. These investmentsi  and ownership arrangements may have put a 
strain on the firm's capital budgeting and capital management systems. 
We now use the conclusions reached in our strategy analysis to investigate 
Enron's'  accounting and financial information, in order to evaluate its financial 
performance and determine whether the firm's'  accounting and financial policies 
made sense. We believe thatt most financial analysts should have seen red flags 
and warned investors of the company's'  shaky financial situation. In this regard, 
we highlight actionable danger signals apparent in the financial statements and 
mandated Securities and Exchange Commission filings, signals that analysts 
should have recognized,, identified,, and warned stakeholders about. 
ACCOUNTING ANALYSIS 
Overview ofAccounting Analysis 
The purpose of accounting analysis is to evaluate the degree to which a 
firm's accounting system captures its underlying economic reality, given in­
herent management biases and the substantial accounting flexibility that man­
agementt isi  empowered with (Palepul  et al. 2000, 3-1). For this purpose we use 
Enron's'  precollapse publicly available and externally audited income state­
ments, balance sheets, statements of cash flows, notes to the financial statements, 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) reports, and independent audi­
tor reports. We supplement this with other information that was readily avail­
able to analysts.. 
For each financial statement account category-assets, liabilities, sharehold­
ers' equity, revenues, and expenses-we use our knowledge of the firm's profit 
drivers and risk factors to identifyi  key areas of accounting flexibility, bearing 
in mind thatt  there are strong relations between the various categories (for ex­
ample, revenue recognition policies directly impact assets).. We evaluate the 
appropriateness of thet  accounting policies and estimates chosen by manage­
ment,, and we attempt to assess the degree of distortion in reported numbers. 
Where possible, we attempt to negate the effect of perceived distortions in 
reported numbers by using cash flow numbers, disclosures made in the notes 
to thet  financial statements, and qualified opinions given by the external audi­
tors. This provides us a springboard from which to launch into financial analysis, 
using our own adjusted numbers (if deemed necessary) to improve the reli­
ability of our financial analysis calculations (see Palepu et al. 2000, 3-1). 
Another important part of accountingi  analysis is to demarcate the bound­
aries of the business by looking beyond the legal definitions that normallyll  
 
COntrolontr  financial reporting. As analysts, we should be far more concerned with 
eConomic substance than with legal form. We want to know what resources 
the firm controls, a much broader focus than the narrowly defined legal form 
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Asset Analysis 
Enron's audit reports from Arthur Andersen are clean. In both the 1999 and 
2000 reports, however, Arthur Andersen specifically informs shareholders and 
the Board ofDirectors of the following (using identical wording for both years): 
"As discussed in Note 18 to the consolidated financial statements, Enron Corp. 
and subsidiaries changed ... its method of accounting for certain contracts in 
energy trading and risk management activities in the first quarter of 1999" 
(1999 annual report, 40; 2000 annual report, 30). We will deal with the effects 
of this very significant accounting change-accounting for contracts (deriva­
tives) in energy trading-under asset analysis. 
Significant challenges face the financial analyst with regard to reported as­
sets. Management often has considerable discretion over whether expendi­
tures are capitalized or expensed. Decisions in this area can significantly affect 
profits and earnings per share, a ratio that stock market participants (including 
the financial news media) and Enron management (by its own admission) were 
particularly fixated on. We have already identified this self-declared fixation 
as a key risk area for Enron. 
Instead of launching into an unstructured examination of Enron's financial 
statements, we will (to use the same term that Enron used with regard to earn­
ings per share) "laser-focus" on the risk areas that we identified during strat­
egy analysis and apply the six accounting analysis steps to each risk area. 
The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities 
A major area of concern is the firm's move away from its successful core 
businesses into higher-risk dealer and trading activities, although this was not 
immediately evident to us from strategy disclosures in the firm's public filings 
but took some "digging" to discern. Accounting analysis may provide addi­
tional insight and either alleviate or strengthen our concerns. A related re­
ported asset is called "assets from price risk management activities," and it 
was immediately apparent that a decided increase occurred in 2000, in both 
absolute and relative terms. The amount of this asset, with the percentage of 
total assets in parentheses, for each of the past five years was 1996, $2,473 
million (15%); 1997, $2,384 million (11 %); 1998, $3,845 million (13%); 1999, 
$5,134 million (15%); and 2000, $21,006 million (32%). This dramatic in­
crease coincided with the introduction of Enron Online, which Web-enabled 
Enron's trading activities. A scrutiny of the quarterly Form lO-Q filings for 
2000 reveals that at the end of the first quarter the amount was $6,567 million 
(18%), in the second quarter $10,924 million (24%), and in the third quarter 
$14,661 million (28%), a continual increase throughout the year. 
Management explains Enron's accounting policy for this asset in footnote 1, 
"Summary of Significant Accounting Policies," of the 2000 annual report as 
follows (emphasis added by authors): 
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of an entity. Generally, we would search for hidden commitments or losses 
from investments in other entities, the transfer of resources to other entities 
that the firm can somehow control (e.g., related entities owned or managed 
personally by Enron management), and possible investment in management 
pet projects that have high risk and a low return (see Palepu et al. 2000, 8-1). 
Therefore, we also perform entity accounting analysis. 
When performing the accounting analysis, we take the following six steps, 
consistent with the Palepu et al. framework (2000, 3-7 to 3-13): 
Step 1: Check the audit report. Is it "clean"? Identify and evaluate the key accounting 
policies that Enron uses to measure critical success factors and risk areas. 
Step 2: Assess the flexibility that management has in choosing accounting policies and 
estimates, and try to discern management's most likely motivation (e.g., to improve 
earnings per share and debt covenant ratios). 
Step 3: Evaluate accounting strategy. For example, was the strategy used to communi­
cate business reality or to hide performance? Does management have strong moti­
vation to manage earnings? Regarding earnings management, does the firm have 
debt covenants? Has management changed estimates and policies? Is there any evi­
dence to suggest that Enron structures business transactions specifically to achieve 
certain accounting numbers? 
Step 4: Evaluate the depth and quality of the disclosures. For example, do the notes to 
the financial statements adequately explain key accounting policies and assump­
tions? Does management adequately explain financial performance? What is the 
quality of segment disclosures? Does management aggregate many different busi­
nesses in a single segment? Does management disclose bad news in addition to good 
news? Does management adequately address performance problems? How good is 
Enron's investor relations program? How does management deal with analysts? 
Step 5: Identify red flags that indicate potential accounting-quality problems and use 
these as starting points for further investigation. For example, are there unexplained 
changes in accounting? Are there unexplained or complex transactions? Is there an 
increasing gap between net income from operations and cash flow from operations? 
Is there an increasing gap between net income and taxable income? Is there evi­
dence of unusual financing? Are there large and unexpected asset write-offs? Are 
there related-party transactions or transactions between related entities that may 
Enron'slack objectivity in the marketplace---especially in view of position ofpower 
due to vertical integration, which allowed it to control more than one stage of the 
industry'S transactions, including that of market maker? Is there evidence that Enron 
exerts control over other entities that are not legally part of the group? 
Step 6: Unravel possible accounting distortions by restating reported numbers. This is 
not always possible, because of lack of information. The notes to the financial state­
ments and the cash flow statement may supply information useful for this purpose. 
By making these restatements as analysts, we do not accuse the firm of misstate­
ment, but we restate components ofthe financial statements based on our external 
perceptions ofthe underlying business reality ofthe firm. In the event of an error in 
judgment, we would prefer to err on the side of caution. 
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Assetsset Analysisnalysis 
Enron'sEnron's auditaudit reportsreports fromfro  Arthurrthur Andersenndersen areare clean.clean. InIn bothboth thethe 19991999 andand 
20002000 reports,reports, however,ho ever, Arthurrthur Andersenndersen specificallyspecifical y informsinfor s shareholdersshareholders andand 
thethe Boardoard ofof Directorsirectors ofof thethe followingfol owing (using(using identicalidentical wordingording forfor bothboth years):years): 
"As" s discusseddiscussed inin Noteote 1818 toto thethe consolidatedconsolidated financialfinancial statements,state ents, Enronnron Corp.orp. 
andand subsidiariessubsidiaries changedchanged ...... itsits methodethod off accountingaccounting forfor certaincertain contractscontracts inin 
energyenergy tradingtrading andand riskrisk managementanage ent activitiesactivities inin thethe firstfirst quarterarter ofof 1999"1999" 
(1999(  annualual report,report, 40;40; 20002000 annuala ual report,report, 30).30). Wee willill dealeal withith thethe effectseffects 
off thist is veryvery significantsignifica t accountingcc ting change-accountingc a e-acc ti  forfor contractscontracts (deriva­(deriva­
tives)ti s) ini  energyer  trading-undertr i - r assetsset analysis.l sis. 
Significanti ifica t challengeslle es faceface thet e financialfi i l analystl st withit  regardre ar  tot  reportedr rte  as­s­
sets.s ts. Managementt oftenfte  hasas considerablesi r l  discretioni r ti  overer whethert r expendi­i­
turest r  are capitalizedit li  orr expensed.. Decisionsi i s ini  thist is arear  can significantlyi ifi tl  affectff t 
profitsit  and earningsr i s perr share,r , a ratioti  thatt t stockt  markett participantsti i ts (including(i l i  
the financiali l news media) and Enron management (by its own admission)i ) were 
particularlyl l  fixated on.. We have alreadyl  identifiedi i  thisi  self-declaredl l  fixationi  
as a key riski  area for Enron.. 
Instead of launching into an unstructured examination of Enron's financial 
statements, we will (to use the same term that Enron used with regard to earn­
ings per share) "laser-focus" on the risk areas that we identified during strat­
egy analysis and apply the six accounting analysis steps to each risk area. 
The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities 
A major area of concern is the firm's move away from its successful core 
businesses into higher-risk dealer and trading activities, although this was not 
immediately evident to us from strategy disclosures in the firm's public filings 
but took some "digging" to discern. Accounting analysis may provide addi­
tional insight and either alleviate or strengthen our concerns. A related re­
ported asset is called "assets from price risk management activities," and it 
was immediately  apparent that  a  decided increase occurred  in 2000,  in both  
absolute  and relative terms. The  amount  of  this asset, with  the  percentage of  
total  assets  in parentheses,  for  each  of  the  past  five years  was 1996, $2,473,  
millionil  (15%); 1997,  $2,384, millioni  (11%); 1998,  $3,845,  millionil  (13%);  1999,  
$5,134  million  (15%);  and 2000,  $21,006  millioni  (32%).  This  dramatic  in­
crease  coincidedi  withi  thet  introductionti  offEnron  Online,li  whichi  Web-enabled-  
Enron'sr '  tradingt i  activities.ti it  A  scrutinyti  off thet  quarterlyt  Form  lO-Ql  filingsfil  for  
2000 revealsr l  thatt t att thet end offthet firstfir t quarterrt thet amounttwas  $6,567,  millionilli  
(18%),( ), ini  thet  second  quarterrt r$10,924,  millionilli  (24%),( ), and  ini  thet  thirdt i  quarterrt r 
$14,661,  millionilli  (28%),( ), a continualti l increasei r  throughoutt r t thet  year.r. 
Managementana e e texplainse lai s Enron'sr '  accountingti policyli  forf r thist i  assetsset ini  footnotef t t  1,1, 
"Summary" ar  offSignificanti ifi tAccountingcc ti  Policies,"olicies," offthet  2000  annuala al reportre rt asa  
followsf ll s (emphasis(e phasis addedaddedby authors):authors): 
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Table 5.1 
Enron's Net Assets from Price-Risk-ManagementActivities (In Millions of US. 
Dollars) 
2000 1999 1998 1997 
Current Assets 12,018 2,205 1,904 1,346
Current Liabilities 10,495 1,836 2,511 ],245
Net Current Assets ],523 369 (607) \01 
Non-Current Assets 8,988 2,929 1,9411 1,038
Non-Current Liabilities 9,423 2,990 ],421 876 
Net Non-Current Assets (435) (61 ) 1625201 
1,088 308 (87) I 263 
780 395 (350) 
763 395 (350) (20]) 
(17) 
° 
0 
° 
*Entire amount classified as resulting from "operating" activities as opposed to the long-term 
portion being classified as resulting from investing activities. 
The effects of Enron's highly aggregated disclosure are first, that unreal­
ized gains or losses in net income cannot be ascertained; and second, cash 
flow effects ofnontrading risk-management activities have been excluded from 
"Cash Flows from Investing Activities" and diverted to the operating activities 
section of the cash flow statement. Enron does have nontrading activities in 
this regard, as evidenced by its disclosure that "Enron engages in price risk 
management activities for both trading and non-trading purposes." If we ac­
cept that the noncurrent net assets should be excluded from the operating sec­
tion, the impact on operating cash flow would be positive, at $708 million 
instead of $350 million, for 1998; negative, at $976 million instead of $395 
million for 1999; and negative at $1,154 million instead of $763 million, for 
2000. Cash flows relating to investing activities would be affected by the same 
amounts but in the opposite direction. 
The reported effects of the change in net assets from risk-management ac­
tivities on operating cash flow from 1996 to 2000 are as follows (percentage 
impact on net income before tax is shown in parentheses): 1996, $15 million 
negative (minus 3%); 1997, $201 million negative (minus 191%); 1998, $350 
million negative (minus 50%); 1999, $395 million positive (44%); and 2000, 
$763 million positive (78%). Scrutiny of the quarterly Form lO-Q filings for 
2000 reveals that at the end of the third quarter the negative impact on cash 
flow amounted to $952 million, exceeding the net income amount of $919 
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Accounting for Price Risk Management. Enron engages in price risk management 
activitiesfor both trading and non-trading purposes. Instruments utilized in connec­
tion with trading activities are accounted for using the mark-to-market method. Under 
the mark-to-market method of accounting, forwards, swaps, options, energy transpor­
tation contracts utilized for trading activities and other instruments with third parties 
are reflected at fair value and are shown as "Assets and Liabilities from Price Risk 
Management Activities" in the Consolidated Balance Sheet. These activities also in­
clude the commodity risk management component embedded in energy outsourcing 
contracts. Unrealized gains and losses from newly originated  contracts, contract 
"Other Revenues."restructurings and the impact of price movements are recognized as  
... The market prices used to value these transactions reflect management's best esti­
mate considering various factors including closing exchange and over-the-counter quo­
tations, time value and volatility factors underlying the commitments. (p. 36) 
The question that comes to mind is: What percentage of net income is at­
tributable to these unrealized gains that are included in earned revenue? As the 
footnote mentions, revenues from price risk management activities are not 
shown separately on the income statement but are unobtrusively lumped in 
with "Other Revenue."ue." Nevertheless, we attempt to quantify the revenue im­
pact of these financial instrument trading activities by appealing to the state­
ment of cash flows and the reconciliation between accrual-based net income 
(which is increased by these activities) and cash generated by operating ac­
tivities (which excludes revenue from these activities because the revenue is 
unrealized and has not been collected). After taking into consideration Enron's 
disclosure of significant accounting policies-"Enron engages in price risk 
management activities for both trading and non-trading purposes,"-we de­
cided on a wish list of what we would like to see in the statement of cash 
flows. 
First, under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities," we would like to see 
the following line items for net price risk management assets: unrealized gains 
(losses) on trading price risk management assets and unrealized gains on non­
trading price-risk-management assets. 
Second, under "Cash Flows from Investing Activities," we would like to 
see the aggregate amount of expenditures on the portion of net price-risk­
management assets reported as noncurrent (and hence nontrading net assets, 
in our view as outsiders without proprietary information or management dis­
closure to the contrary), as well as proceeds from the sale of such noncurrent 
net assets. 
We are disappointed on both counts. An analysis and attempt at recalcula­
tion of the single line item ofdisclosure on "net assets from price risk manage­
ment activities" under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities" reveals that 
current and noncurrent net assets have been lumped together; only the net 
asset increase has been disclosed (note that there is a $17 million unexplained 
discrepancy in 2000). Details of our calculations appear in table 5.1. 
80 Practical Financial Economics 
Accounting for Price Risk Management. Enron engages in price risk management
activitiesfor both trading and non-trading purposes. Instruments utilized in connec­
tion with trading activities are accounted for using the mark-to-market method. Under
the mark-to-market method of accounting, forwards, swaps, options, energy transpor­
tation contracts utilized for trading activities and other instruments with third parties
are reflected at fair value and are shown as "Assets and Liabilities from Price Risk
Management Activities" in the Consolidated Balance Sheet. These activities also in­
clude the commodity risk management component embedded in energy outsourcing
contracts. Unrealized gains and losses from newly originated contracts, contract
restructurings and the impact of price movements are recognized as "Other Revenues."
... The market prices used to value these transactions reflect management's best esti­
mate considering various factors including closing exchange and over-the-counter quo­
tations, time value and volatility factors underlying the commitments. (p. 36) 
The question that comes to mind is: What percentage of net income is at­
tributable to these unrealized gains that are included in earned revenue? As the
footnote mentions, revenues from price risk management activities are not
shown separately on the income statement but are unobtrusively lumped in
with "Other Revenue." Nevertheless, we attempt to quantify the revenue im­
pact of these financial instrument trading activities by appealing to the state­
ment of cash flows and the reconciliation between accrual-based net income
(which is increased by these activities) and cash generated by operating ac­
tivities (which excludes revenue from these activities because the revenue is
unrealized and has not been collected). After taking into consideration Enron's
disclosure of significant accounting policies-"Enron engages in price risk
management activities for both trading and non-trading purposes,"-we de­
cided on a wish list of what we would like to see in the statement of cash
flows. 
First, under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities," we would like to see
the following line items for net price risk management assets: unrealized gains
(losses) on trading price risk management assets and unrealized gains on non­
trading price-risk-management assets. 
Second, under "Cash Flows from Investing Activities," we would like to 
see the aggregate amount of expenditures on the portion of net price-risk­
management assets reported as noncurrent (and hence nontrading net assets, 
in our view as outsiders without proprietary information or management dis­
closure to the contrary), as well as proceeds from the sale of such noncurrent
net assets. 
We are disappointed on both counts. An analysis and attempt at recalcula­
tion of the single line item ofdisclosure on "net assets from price risk manage­
ment activities" under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities" reveals that 
current and noncurrent net assets have been lumped together; only the net 
asset increase has been disclosed (note that there is a $17 million unexplained 
discrepancy in 2000). Details of our calculations appear in table 5.1. 
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5.1TableTable 5.1 
of US.Enron'sEnron's NetNet AssetsAs ets fromfrom Price-Risk-ManagementActivitiesPrice-Risk-ManagementActivities (In(In MillionsMillions ofD.S. 
Dollars)Dollars) 
200020  199919  19981998 19971997 
CurrentCurrent AssetsAssets 12,01812,018 2,2052,205 1,9041,904 1,3461,346 
CurrentCurrent LiabilitiesLiabilities 10,49510,495 1,8361,836 2,5112,511 ],245],245 
NetNet CurrentCurrent AssetsAssets ],523],523 369369 (607)(607) \01101 
Non-CurrentNon-Current AssetsAssets 8,9888,98  2,9292,929 1,94111,941 1,0381,038 
Non-CurrentNon-Current LiabilitiesLiabilities 9,4239,423 2,9902,990 ],4211,421 876876 
NetNet Non-CurrentNon-Current AssetsAssets (435)(435) )(61(61 ) 5201520 162]62 
Calculated Net Assets (Combined) 1,0881,088 308308 (87)(87) I 263263 
Calculated Net Change (Combined) 780780 395395 (350)(350) -
Net Change (Combined) per Cash 763763 395395 (350)(350) (20])(201) 
Flow Statement* 
Unexplained Difference (17)( ) 
°
0 00 
°
0 
*Entirentire amounta ount classifiedclassifie  asas resultingresulting fromfro  "operating"" erati " activitiesacti ities asas opposedse  tot  thet  long-terml -t r  
portionrti  beingi  classifiedclassifie  asas resultingr s lti  fromfr  investingi esti  activities.acti iti s. 
The effects of Enron's highly aggregated disclosure are first, that unreal­
ized gains or losses in net income cannot be ascertained; and second, cash 
flow effects ofnontrading risk-management activities have been excluded from 
"Cash Flows from Investing Activities" and diverted to the operating activities 
section of  the cash flow statement. Enron does have nontrading activities in 
this regard, as evidenced by its disclosure that "Enron engages  in  price risk 
management  activities  for  both trading and  non-trading  purposes.".  If  we ac­
cept thatt thet  noncurrent  net  assetst  shouldl  be  excludedl  from  the  operatingti  sec­
tion,ti , the  impactt on operatingti  cash  flowl  wouldl  be  positive,iti , att $708  millionilli  
insteadi t  of  $350  million,illi , forf  1998;; negative,ti , att $976  millionilli  insteadi t  off $395  
millionilli  forf r 1999;; anda  negativee ati  atat $1,154,  millionilli  insteadi t  off$763  million,illi , forf r 
2000..Cashas flowsfl s relatingrelati totoinvestinginvesti activitiesactivitieswouldo l bebeaffectedaffect byb thethesamesa  
amountsa o ts buttini  thet  oppositesit direction.irecti n. 
Thehereportedreportedeffectseffects ofofthethechangechangeininnetnetassetsassets fromfro  risk-managementrisk- anage entac­ac­
tivitiestivities ononoperatingoperatingcashcashflowflo  fromfro  19961996toto20002000areareasas followsfo lo s (percentage(percentage 
impacti pactononnetnetincomeinco ebeforebeforetaxtaxisisshownsho nininparentheses):parentheses): 1996,1996,$15$15millioni lion 
negativenegative(minus(minus3%);3 ); 1997,1997,$201$201millionmi lionnegativenegative(minus(minus191191%););1998,1998,$350$350 
millioni lionnegativenegative(minus(minus50%);50 );1999,1999,$395$395millionmi lionpositivepositive(44%);(44%);andand2000,2000, 
$763$763millionmi lionpositivepositive(78%).(78%).ScrutinyScrutinyofofthethequarterlyquarterlyFormForm lO-QlO-Qfilingsfilingsforfor 
20002000revealsrevealsthatthatatatthetheendendofofthethethirdthirdquarterquarterthethenegativenegativeimpactimpactononcashcash 
flowflowamountedamountedtoto$952$952million,mi lion,exceedingexc edingthethenetnetincomeincomeamountamountofof$919$919 
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unprecedented and surprising move, a post-Enron SEC has taken this notion a 
step farther. In a warning by the chief accountant for the SEC's enforcement 
division (Liesman 2002), management and the auditors have been informed in 
no uncertain terms that it is possible to violate SEC laws while being in compli­
ance with generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore, mere compliance 
with the rules without considering whether the results "fairly present" finan­
cial performance could lead to legal proceedings for securities fraud. It is in 
this light that we discuss briefly the FASB standards for derivatives, by which 
Enronjustified its mark-to-market valuation approach. 
Derivatives are initiated via legal contracts, without any immediate signifi­
cant expenditure. These contracts represent legal rights and obligations, from 
which assets and liabilities arise. Enron to some degree highlighted this prob­
lem when during the first half of the 1990s it took the lead and incorporated 
mark-to-market accounting for energy-related derivative contracts and there­
after used it on an unprecedented scale. Under mark-to-market rules, assets 
and liabilities resulting from the legal rights and obligations of the contracts 
are recorded at fair market value. The determination of a fair value at which to 
record these rights and obligations as assets and liabilities is a major problem 
in accounting for markets that are largely unregulated and not well established, 
with no quoted prices. Enron began trading in a variety of these markets as a 
first-mover (for example, trading in energy-related derivatives, bandwidth, data 
storage, paper, and weather derivatives) and essentially caught accounting stan­
dard setters offguard. Firms like Enron were free to develop and use discretionary 
valuation models to value their assets and liabilities, allowing considerable 
management discretion. The resultant unrealized gains or losses were used to 
determine net income. Existing financial instruments standards had not been 
prepared with unregulated markets (such as those that Enron created) in mind. 
The latitude that Enron had, by which it acted as buyer, seller, and market 
maker, exacerbated this situation, regardless of whether or not it followed FASB 
standards. Consequently, we do not feel at all comfortable with the quality of 
these earnings. 
From a financial analysis perspective, because of Enron's multiple roles 
(buyer, seller, market maker) and resultant quality of earnings concerns, we 
argue for the reversal of unrealized gains until such time as realization war­
rants recognition as revenue. In the event of a net unrealized loss, we support 
a transfer to the income statement, invoking the conservatism concept in ac­
counting as justification for the disparate treatment. As we cannot determine 
the amount of the unrealized gains because of insufficient disclosure in the 
cash flow statements, we will use the cash flow numbers as reported by Enron 
(although we strongly suspect that these are also flawed, because noncurrent 
price risk net assets are treated as current and operating). However, we will 
adjust net income to the best of our ability to negate the effect of increases 
resulting from these activities. The cash flow does provide an alternative bench­
mark for reporting (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-13). This is the route we will take for 
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million.million. This switch from anegativenegativecash-flowcash-flowimpactimpactsituationsituation(1996(1996 to1998)1998)This switch from a to 
to apositivepositivesituationsituation(1999(1999 and2000)2000) may berelatedrelated to theadoptionadoption at theto a and may be to the at the 
beginningbeginning of 1999 of theEmergingEmerging Issues Task Force Issue No.98-10,98-10, "Ac­of 1999 of the Issues Task Force Issue No. "Ac­
countingcounting forContractsContracts Involved inEnergyEnergyTradingTrading and RiskManagementManagement Ac­for Involved in and Risk Ac­
tivities,"tivities," which requiresrequires energy tradingtrading contracts (including(including energywhich energy contracts energy 
transportationtransportationcontracts)contracts) to berecordedrecorded at fair value on the balance sheet(mark(markto be at fair value on the balance sheet 
to market).market). This standardstandard gave the rubberstampstamp tomanagementmanagement to use itsto This gave the rubber to to use its 
considerable discretion asbuyer,buyer,seller,seller, and market maker in detennining theconsiderable discretion as and market maker in determining the 
value of itsprice-risk-managementprice-risk-management assets andliabilities.liabilities. Thecumulativecumulative fi­value of its assets and The fi­
nancialnancial effect of this accountingaccounting changechange on net incomeincome was notseparatelyseparatelyeffect of this on net was not 
quantifiedquantified but wasaggregatedaggregated in the amount of $131million,million,togethertogether with anbut was in the amount of $131 with an 
amountrelatingrelating toanotheranotheraccountingaccountingchangechangemademade at thebeginningbeginning of1999.1999.amount to at the of 
TakenTaken at face value,value, theeffecteffect of the changechange does not appear to bematerial.material.at face the of the does not appear to be 
TheTheAccountingAccountingPronouncementsPronouncementsfootnotefootnotestates,states,"The"Thefirstfirstquarterquarter19991999chargecharge 
was primarilyprimarily relatedrelated to the adoptionadoption of SOPSOP 98-5,"98-5," whichwhich requiresrequires the ex­was to the of the ex­
pensingpensing ofallall startupstartup andandorganizationorganization costs. However,However, once thethe new Emerg­Emerg­of costs. once new 
inging IssuesIssues standardstandard on energyenergy tradingtrading contracts was issued,issued, thethe managementmanagementon contracts was 
ofEnronEnron was effectivelyeffectively givengiven carte blancheblanche on relatedrelated net-asset valuations.valuations.of was carte on net-asset 
As discusseddiscussed in thethe strategystrategy analysis,analysis, EnronEnron changedchanged its SICSIC codecode duringduringAs in its 
thethe lastlast quarterquarter of 2000,2000, probablyprobably becausebecause of itsits focusfocus on energyenergy tradingtrading ac­of of on ac­
tivities.tivities. ThisThis knowledge,knowledge, coupledcoupled withwith our concerns aboutabout unrealizedunrealized gainsgains onour concerns on 
risk-managementrisk-management nets assets,assets, leadsleads us directlydirectly intointo thethe secondsecond riskrisk factor­factor­nets us 
management'smanagement's self-declaredself-declared sharpsharp focusfocus on earningsearnings perper share.share. OurOur concernson concerns 
are heightenedheightened becausebecause management,management, byby itsits own admissionadmission inin thethe quotedquoted ac­are own ac­
countingcounting policypolicy statement,statement, largelylargely determinesdetermines thethe marketmarket valuevalue ofof thesethese finan­finan­
cialcial instruments,instruments, includingincluding energyenergy transportationtransportation contracts,contracts, inin an unregulatedunregulatedan 
market.market. Coincidently,Coincidently, inin latelate 20002000 CongressCongress passedpassed legislationlegislation thatthat exemptedexempted 
over-the-counterover-the-counter derivativesderivatives fromfrom regulationregulation afterafter some veryvery aggressiveaggressive lob­lob­some 
byingbying byby EnronEnron (see(see SchroederSchroeder andand IpIp 2001;2001; SchroederSchroeder 2002).2002). ThisThis marketmarket 
was new andand largelylargely initiatedinitiated byby Enron,Enron, oftenoften withoutwithout externallyexternally quotedquoted prices·prices·was new 
uponupon whichwhich to basebase asset valuations.valuations. Enron,Enron, in itsits capacitycapacity as thethe marketmarket maker,maker,to asset in as 
was freefree to effectivelyeffectively managemanage itsits earnings.earnings. A majormajor concern thatthat comes towas to A concern comes to 
mindmind is whetherwhether managementmanagement is usingusing thesethese unrealizedunrealized gainsgains to makemake up forforis is to up 
possiblepossible poorpoor performanceperformance in otherother high-riskhigh-risk ventures,ventures, suchsuch as thethe asset-intensiveasset-intensivein as 
Dabhol power plantplant in India,India, water systems,systems, and broadband.Dabhol power in water and broadband. 
EvenEven if a firmfirm chooseschooses to blindlyblindly followfollow an accountingaccounting standard,standard, withoutwithoutif a to an 
consideringconsidering the underlyingunderlying businessbusiness reality,reality, the resultantresultant financialfinancial informationinformationthe the 
can be misleading.misleading. The questionquestion is this: Does the selectionselection of the policypolicy orcan be The is this: Does the of the or 
estimateestimate result in the closestclosest portrayalportrayal of businessbusiness reality,reality, fairlyfairly presentingpresenting theresult in the of the 
underlyingunderlying economiceconomic conditions?conditions? If the analystanalyst believesbelieves that businessbusiness realityrealityIf the that 
is not reflected,reflected, she or he should attemptattempt to undo distortionsdistortions causedcaused by theis not she or he should to undo by the 
selectionselection of a particularparticular accountingaccounting policypolicy or estimate,estimate, regardlessregardless of its institu­institu­of a or of its 
tionalizedtionalized generalgeneral acceptance.acceptance. This notionnotion is not new (see(see PalepuPalepu et al. 2000),2000),This is not new et al. 
but it gainedgained prominenceprominence with the spatespate of recent accountingaccounting failures.failures. In anbut it with the of recent In an 
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million. This switch from a negative cash-flow impact situation (1996 to 1998)
to a positive situation (1999 and 2000) may be related to the adoption at the
beginning of 1999 of the Emerging Issues Task Force Issue No. 98-10, "Ac­
counting for Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Ac­
tivities," which requires energy trading contracts (including energy
transportation contracts) to be recorded at fair value on the balance sheet (mark
to market). This standard gave the rubber stamp to management to use its
considerable discretion as buyer, seller, and market maker in determining the
value of its price-risk-management assets and liabilities. The cumulative fi­
nancial effect of this accounting change on net income was not separately
quantified but was aggregated in the amount of $131 million, together with an
amount relating to another accounting change made at the beginning of 1999.
Taken at face value, the effect of the change does not appear to be material.
The Accounting Pronouncements footnote states, "The first quarter 1999 charge
was primarily related to the adoption of SOP 98-5," which requires the ex­
pensing of all startup and organization costs. However, once the new Emerg­
ing Issues standard on energy trading contracts was issued, the managemen
of Enron was effectively given carte blanche on related net-asset valuations. 
As discussed in the strategy analysis, Enron changed its SIC code 
the last quarter of 2000, probably because of its focus on energy trading ac
tivities. This knowledge, coupled with our concerns about unrealized gains o
risk-management nets assets, leads us directly into the second risk factor
management's self-declared sharp focus on earnings per share. Our concern
1,,1 are heightened because management, by its own admission in the quoted ac
counting policy statement, largely determines the market value of these finan
cial instruments, including energy transportation contracts, in an unregulate
market. Coincidently, in late 2000 Congress passed legislation that exempte
over-the-counter derivatives from regulation after some very aggressive lob
bying by Enron (see Schroeder and Ip 2001; Schroeder 2002). This marke
was new and largely initiated by Enron, often without externally quoted price
upon which to base asset valuations. Enron, in its capacity as the market maker
was free to effectively manage its earnings. A major concern that comes t
mind is whether management is using these unrealized gains to make up fo
possible poor performance in other high-risk ventures, such as the asset-intensiv
Dabhol power plant in India, water systems, and broadband. 
Even if a firm chooses to blindly follow an accounting standard, withou
considering the underlying business reality, the resultant financial informatio
can be misleading. The question is this: Does the selection of the policy o
estimate result in the closest portrayal of business reality, fairly presenting th
underlying economic conditions? If the analyst believes that business realit
is not reflected, she or he should attempt to undo distortions caused by th
selection of a particular accounting policy or estimate, regardless of its institu
tionalized general acceptance. This notion is not new (see Palepu et al. 2000
but it gained prominence with the spate of recent accounting failures. In a
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a aunprecedentedunprecedented andand surprisingsurprising move,move, a post-Enronpost-Enron SECSEC hashas takentaken thisthis notionnotion a 
a accountantstepstep farther.farther. InIn a warningwarning byby thethe chiefchief accountant forfor thethe SEC'sSEC's enforcementenforcement 
divisiondivision (Liesman(Liesman 2002),2002), managementmanagement andand thethe auditorsauditors havehave beenbeen informedinformed inin 
no terms it tono uncertainuncertain terms thatthat it isis possiblepossible to violateviolate SECSEC lawslaws whilewhile beingbeing inin compli­compli­
ance mereance withwith generallygenerally acceptedaccepted accountingaccounting principles.principles. Therefore,Therefore, mere compliancecompliance
withwith thethe rulesrules withoutwithout consideringconsidering whetherwhether thethe resultsresults "fairly"fairly present"present" finan­finan­
tocialcial performanceperformance couldcould leadlead to legallegal proceedingsproceedings forfor securitiessecurities fraud.fraud. ItIt isis inin 
wethisthis lightlight thatthat we discussdiscuss brieflybriefly thethe FASBFASB standardsstandards forfor derivatives,derivatives, byby whichwhich 
EnronjustifiedEnronjustified itsits mark-to-marketmark-to-market valuationvaluation approach.approach. 
areDerivativesDerivatives are initiatedinitiated viavia legallegal contracts,contracts, withoutwithout anyany immediateimmediate signifi­signifi­
cant contractscant expenditure.expenditure. TheseThese contracts representrepresent legallegal rightsrights andand obligations,obligations, fromfrom 
assets to somewhichwhich assets andand liabilitiesliabilities arise.arise. EnronEnron to some degreedegree highlightedhighlighted thisthis prob­prob­
lemlem whenwhen duringduring thethe firstfirst halfhalf ofof thethe 1990s1990s itit tooktook thethe leadlead andand incorporatedincorporated 
contractsmark-to-marketmark-to-market accountingaccounting forfor energy-relatedenergy-related derivativederivative contracts andand there­there­
it on an assetsafterafter usedused it on an unprecedentedunprecedented scale.scale. UnderUnder mark-to-marketmark-to-market rules,rules, assets 
contractsandand liabilitiesliabilities resultingresulting fromfrom thethe legallegal rightsrights andand obligationsobligations ofof thethe contracts 
are at a at toare recordedrecorded at fairfair marketmarket value.value. TheThe determinationdetermination ofof a fairfair valuevalue at whichwhich to 
as assets is arecordrecord thesethese rightsrights andand obligationsobligations as assets andand liabilitiesliabilities is a majormajor problemproblem 
are notinin accountingaccounting forfor marketsmarkets thatthat are largelylargely unregulatedunregulated andand not wellwell established,established, 
no a as awithwith no quotedquoted prices.prices. EnronEnron beganbegan tradingtrading inin a varietyvariety ofof thesethese marketsmarkets as a 
-moverfirstfirst-mover (for(for example,example, tradingtrading inin energy-relatedenergy-related derivatives,derivatives, bandwidth,bandwidth, datadata 
stan­storage,storage, paper,paper, andand weatherweather derivatives)derivatives) andand essentiallyessentially caughtcaught accountingaccounting stan­
setters were to usedarddard setters offoff guard.guard. FirmsFirms likelike EnronEnron were freefree to developdevelop andand use discretionarydiscretionary 
to assetsvaluationvaluation modelsmodels to valuevalue theirtheir assets andand liabilities,liabilities, allowingallowing considerableconsiderable 
or were tomanagementmanagement discretion.discretion. TheThe resultantresultant unrealizedunrealized gainsgains or losseslosses were usedused to 
net notdeterminedetermine net income.income. ExistingExisting financialfinancial instrumentsinstruments standardsstandards hadhad not beenbeen 
aspreparedprepared withwith unregulatedunregulated marketsmarkets (such(such as thosethose thatthat EnronEnron created)created) inin mind.mind. 
asTheThe latitudelatitude thatthat EnronEnron had,had, byby whichwhich itit actedacted as buyer,buyer, seller,seller, andand marketmarket 
or not itmaker,maker, exacerbatedexacerbated thisthis situation,situation, regardlessregardless ofof whetherwhether or not it followedfollowed FASBFASB 
we not atstandards.standards. Consequently,Consequently, we dodo not feelfeel at allall comfortablecomfortable withwith thethe qualityquality ofof 
thesethese earnings.earnings. 
aFromFrom a financialfinancial analysisanalysis perspective,perspective, becausebecause ofof Enron'sEnron's multiplemultiple rolesroles 
concerns, we(buyer,(buyer, seller,seller, marketmarket maker)maker) andand resultantresultant qualityquality ofof earningsearnings concerns, we 
as war­argueargue forfor thethe reversalreversal ofof unrealizedunrealized gainsgains untiluntil suchsuch timetime as realizationrealization war­
rants as revenue. event a net werants recognitionrecognition as revenue. InIn thethe event ofof a net unrealizedunrealized loss,loss, we supportsupport 
a to ac­a transfertransfer to thethe incomeincome statement,statement, invokinginvoking thethe conservatismconservatism conceptconcept inin ac­
as treatment. we cannotcountingcounting as justificationjustification forfor thethe disparatedisparate treatment. AsAs we cannot determinedetermine 
amountthethe amount ofof thethe unrealizedunrealized gainsgains becausebecause ofof insufficientinsufficient disclosuredisclosure inin thethe 
we use ascashcash flowflow statements,statements, we willwill use thethe cashcash flowflow numbersnumbers as reportedreported byby EnronEnron 
we are noncurrent(although(although we stronglystrongly suspectsuspect thatthat thesethese are alsoalso flawed,flawed, becausebecause noncurrent 
price net assets are as current wePrice riskrisk net assets are treatedtreated as current andand operating).operating). However,However, we willwill 
net to our toadjustadjust net incomeincome to thethe bestbest ofof our abilityability to negatenegate thethe effecteffect ofof increasesincreases 
anresultingresulting fromfrom thesethese activities.activities. TheThe cashcash flowflow doesdoes provideprovide an alternativealternative bench­bench­
mark et welllark forfor reportingreporting (Palepu(Palepu et al.al. 2000,2000, 3-13).3-13). ThisThis isis thethe routeroute we willwill taketake forfor 
during 
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We could find only a few voices of dissent in the analyst community prior 
to November 2001. For example, as far back as March 2001, the Reed Wasden 
Research team wrote: "At the risk of offending Enron's mighty investor rela­
tions army [emphasis added], we will attempt to paint a simplistic portrait of 
what we believe Enron really is" (Wasden, Ayers, and Arias 2001, 4). This 
firm appears to have emerged unscathed after questioning Enron's future pros­
pects, but other dissenting analysts were not as fortunate. One of these was 
Chung Wu of DBS PaineWebber (Lozano 2002; Babineck 2002). Another 
was Daniel Scotto, a bond analyst in New York for BNP Paribas, a French 
securities firm (Smith 2002). 
Wu sent an e-mail message to his clients on August 21,2001, expressing 
concern about Enron's financial future and advising them to sell their Enron 
stock. He was fired the same day. This happened a week after Jeffrey Skilling 
resigned as Enron's chief executive officer. At the time, Enron stock was in 
the range of $36, less than half of its peak earlier in the year. In a regulatory 
filing dated August 31,2001, to the National Association of Securities Deal­
ers, Wu made the following statement: "Enron management was not pleased 
and due to the employee stock option relationship DBS PaineWebber has with 
them, the pressure came from my corporate office to the branch level (Hous­
ton) to dismiss me." (For detailed newswire reports, see Lozano 2002; Babineck 
2002.) DBS PaineWebber did not deny that it had sacked Chung, nor did the 
firm deny that the dismissal came after complaints about the e-mail from the 
Enron executive in charge of its stock option program (Washington Post March 
28, 2002, A47). 
Another example is that of Scotto, a thirty-year Wall Street veteran, who 
issued a research report to his clients on August 23,2001, in which he lowered 
his recommendation on Enron from "buy" to "neutral" and suggested that 
Enron be used as a "source of funds" (i.e., in analyst language, "consider selling 
the stock to raise funds for other investments"). He followed up his written report 
with a conference call, recorded from the firm's trading floor, wherein he ad­
vised his clients to dump Enron securities. Shortly afterward, he was demoted, 
put on leave, and then terminated. BNP Paribas declined to give reporters 
reasons for Scotto's termination but made the statement that it "was com­
pletely unrelated to any research he wrote on any company, including Enron." 
Scotto, however, claims that BNP Paribus had an investment-banking rela­
tionship with Enron. (For the detailed business news report, see Smith 2002.) 
Management's seemingly aggressive and intimidating manner of handling 
adverse analyst reports should have incensed the financial analyst community, 
as it impairs its independence. The Reed Wasden quote shows that analysts 
were well aware of the "mighty investor relations army." This behavior toward 
analysts does not inspire confidence in reported numbers. One has to ask the 
question: What is Enron trying to hide? It is in this light that we scrutinize 
asset balances and the related accounting policies. 
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Enron in undoing distortions before performing our financial analysis. As a 
result, net income will change materially for 1999 and 2000, with a resultant 
decrease in earnings per share, and net assets from price risk management 
activities will be reduced. We acknowledge that our adjustment has limita­
tions, in that the full amount of  the increase in net assets (included in our 
adjustment because these amounts have not been disclosed separately on the 
cash flow statements) does not have an effect on net income. The effect is 
limited to unrealized gains, which cannot be determined because of  lack of  
information in Enron's disclosures. 
We will now proceed with an examination of  the company's  ventures into 
broadband. We analyze the MD&A and the Broadband Services business seg­
ment, which makes its debut in the 2000 annual report, although Enron had 
dabbled in broadband since 1998 at the very latest but had been incorporating 
it in other business segment disclosures. The MD&A disclosure includes the 
following statement: "Broadband  Services is constructing ... a nationwide 
fiber-optic network that consists of both  fiber deployed by Enron and acquired 
capacity on other non-Enron networks and is managed by Enron's Broadband  
Operating System software. Enron is extending its market-making and risk  
management skills from its energy business to develop the bandwidth interme­
diation business" (2000 annual report, 25). The segment disclosure shows identi­
fiable assets ($1,313 million) and capital expenditures ($436 million) for the 2000 
fiscal year. This is a new industry, and the risk is high. In theory, this could be 
a very successful venture for Enron, but if  a glut of  fiber-optic capacity devel­
ops, Enron may have to take a hit against its asset values. This would, in turn, 
reduce  net income. We cannot predict an outcome, but the risk is high, espe­
cially since, after three years of  experimentation, broadband generated a net 
loss of  $60 million for the 2000 fiscal year (2000 annual report, 51). 
The Maintenance ofInvestor Confidence andAccess to 
Financing Resources, and  Resultant Focus on Earnings per  
Share and  Components ofOther Key Financial Ratios 
Assets are often components of  key ratios, either as an absolute amount, or  
because of  the key role that asset valuation plays in income determination, 
stemming from the relationship between assets and revenues and assets and 
expenses. A major concern regarding this risk area is covered in the preceding 
discussion on Enron's change in operating activities. However, we want to 
determine whether there are any other asset amounts that we need to examine 
more  closely, after we consider the degree of  risk with regard to possible asset 
misstatement. 
To get a feel for this risk, we ask the following questions: How good is 
Enron's investor relations program? How does management deal with ana­
lysts? Here, we resort to external sources for answers. 
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flow statement better fulfills our information requirements for merchant as­
sets and investments than it did for net assets from risk-management activi­
ties, we are concerned about the additions and unrealized gains being aggregated 
and shown on a single line item. This severely hampered our ability to make 
accurate adjustments for unrealized gains, which may have much less of an 
impact on net income than we are surmising. There is a lack of disaggregated 
information disclosure for this line item, but due to the potential for manage­
ment manipulation of these numbers, we decided to treat this line item as an 
unrealized gain in its entirety, as we did for net assets from risk-management 
activities. The potential impact is too great for us to ignore such an adjust­
ment, and we would rather err on the side of caution. We do, however, realize 
that our adjustment has limitations, in that the "additions" component of the 
line item "Additions and Unrealized Gains" does not have an effect on net 
income. Our adjustment is therefore misstated by the amount of the unknown 
cost of these additions. 
Hard-asset, high-risk ventures, such as Dabhol Power and Wessex Water, 
are included in unconsolidated affiliates, and as such the assets are kept offEnron's 
balance sheet. This issue is dealt with under Entity Accounting Analysis. 
Liability Analysis and Shareholders' Equity Analysis 
There are two types of claims against a firm's assets: liabilities and share­
holders' equity. Equity is, by definition, a residual value. Therefore, fair valu­
ations of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses automatically result in a 
fair residual value. Accounting questions concerning equity generally revolve 
around hybrid securities, interest rates used to value long-term debt, and the 
allocation of equity amounts between reserves, retained earnings, and capital. 
Some important questions concerning Enron's liabilities are: Does the firm 
have a business strategy that appears to favor off-balance sheet financing to 
improve debt ratios? Are these significant? (see Palepu et al. 2000, 5-1 to 5-2, 
5-14). We now examine liabilities and equity under each of the key risk areas. 
The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities 
Enron's ''Accounting for Price Risk Management" is described under Asset 
Analysis. Just as these contracts have asset implications to capture rights, they 
also capture Enron's contractual obligations. The difference between the as­
sets and liabilities for each contract results in unrealized gains or losses, using 
the mark-to-market method of valuation, which has already been discussed 
under Asset Analysis. The resultant liabilities are shown as "Liabilities from 
Price Risk Management Activities" on the Consolidated Balance Sheet. We 
have already discussed the reasoning behind our decision to reverse such un­
realized gains, even though the exact amount could not be determined due to 
incomplete information. 
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The  following  asset  balances  catch  our  eye: first, "Investments  in and  ad­
vances  to unconsolidated equity  affiliates,",  which  increased  by 211% between  
1996 and  2000,  from  $1,701  million  to  $5,294,  million;  second,  "Other invest­
ments,"  which  increased  by  236%,, over  the same  period,  from  $1,626  million  
to  $5,459  million.  A related  accounting  policy  intensified  our  interest:  "In­
vestments  in unconsolidated  affiliates  are  accounted  for  by  the equity  method,  
except  for  certain  investments  resulting  from  Enron's'  merchant  investment  
activities  which  are  included  at market  value  in  'Other'  Investments'' in the  
Consolidated  Balance  Sheet. See  Notes 4 and  9.. Where  acquired  assets are  
accounted  for  under  the  equity  method  based  on temporary  control,, earnings 
and losses are recognized only for the portion of the investment  to  be  retained"  
(2000  annual  report,  37). On reading footnotes 4 and 9, we decide  that  this is 
a major  area  of concern and  that  these assets will best be discussed  under  the 
Equity  Accounting  Analysis  subsection. 
Second,  we would  like to see more transparency on  "Other" assets, classi­
fied under  "Investments  and  Other  Assets." The amounts are material-for  
example, $5,459  million  for  2000  and  $4,681 for 1999. Without knowing the 
nature of  these  assets,  it  is difficult  to determine whether we would prefer to 
expense part  or  all of  these  assets.  
The Financial Success ofInternational High-Risk, 
Hard-Asset Ventures and  Complex 
Partnership and Equity Ownership Structures 
Footnote 4 (2000 annual report, 40), "Merchant Activities," shows a split 
between "Merchant Investments" in the amount of  $601 million (included in 
"Other Assets" on the balance sheet) and "Merchant Assets" of  $89 million (in­
cluded in "Investments in and Advances to Unconsolidated Equity Affiliates"). 
The cash flow statements show that both merchant investments and mer­
chant assets are generators of  net income from operating activities, despite the 
fact that a large portion is included under noncurrent assets on the balance 
sheet. This suggests the possibility that cash flow from operations may be 
overstated (as was possible with net assets from price-management activities). 
In this regard, disclosures in the cash flow statements show how accrual-based 
net income is converted to cash flow from operations. In 2000, the line item 
"Additions and Unrealized Gains" on merchant assets and investments is de­
ducted from net income to arrive at cash flow from operating activities, to the 
tune of $1,295 million. Comparative amounts for this line item were 1999, 
$827 million; 1998, $721 million; 1997, $308 million; and 1996, $192 mil­
lion. We have already decided to adjust net income from operations down­
ward for unrealized gains on price-risk-management activities; a similar 
adjustment for "Additions and Unrealized Gains" on merchant assets and in­
vestments has a profound negative affect on net income, especially for 2000. 
"Other Assets" will also be decreased, for duality purposes. Although the cash 
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flow statement better fulfills our informationti  requirements for merchant as­
sets and investments than it did for net assets from risk-management activi­
ties, we are concerned about the additions and unrealized gains being aggregated 
and shown on a single line item. This severely hampered our ability to make 
accurate adjustments for unrealized gains, which may have much less of an 
impact on net income than we are surmising. There is a lack of disaggregated 
information disclosure for this line item, but due to the potential for manage­
ment manipulation of these numbers, we decided to treat this line item as an 
unrealized gain in its entirety, as we did for net assets from risk-management 
activities. The potential impact is too great for us to ignore such an adjust­
ment, and we would rather err on the side of caution. We do, however, realize 
that our adjustment has limitations, in that the "additions" component of the 
line item "Additions and Unrealized Gains" does not have an effect on net 
income. Our adjustment is therefore misstated by the amount of the unknown 
cost of these additions. 
Hard-asset, high-risk ventures, such as Dabhol Power and Wessex Water, 
are included in unconsolidated affiliates, and as such the assets are kept offEnron's 
balance sheet. This issue is dealt with under Entity Accounting Analysis. 
Liability Analysis and Shareholders' Equity Analysis 
There are two types of claims against a firm's'  assets: liabilities and share­
holders'' equity. Equity is, by definition, a residual value. Therefore, fair valu­
ations of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses automatically result in a 
fair residual value. Accounting questions concerning equity generally revolve 
around hybrid securities, interest rates used to value long-term debt, and the 
allocation of equity amounts between reserves, retained earnings, and capital. 
Some important questions concerning Enron's liabilities are: Does the firm 
have a business strategy that appears to favor off-balance sheet financing to 
improve debt ratios? Are these significant? (see Palepu et al. 2000, 5-1 to 5-2, 
5-14). We now examine liabilities and equity under each of the key risk areas. 
The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities 
Enron's'  ''Accounting''  for Price Risk Management" is described under Asset 
Analysis. Just as these contracts have asset implications to capture rights, they 
also capture Enron's contractual obligations. The difference between the as­
sets and liabilities for each contract results in unrealized gains or losses, using 
the mark-to-market method of valuation, which has already been discussed 
under Asset Analysis. The resultant liabilities are shown as "Liabilities from 
Price Risk Management Activities" on the Consolidated Balance Sheet. We 
have already discussed the reasoning behind our decision to reverse such un­
realized gains, even though the exact amount could not be determined due to 
incomplete information. 
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Table 5.2
 
Enron's Reported Long-Term Debt Maturity Values (In Millions of U.S.
 
Dollars)
 
Matures 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1998 Report 541 413 666 182 656 N/A N/A 
1999 Report N/A 670 569 432 494 493 N/A 
2000 Report N/A N/A 2,112 750 852 646 1,592 
In 1999, Enron entered into a Share Settlement Agreement under which Enron could 
be obligated, under certain conditions, to deliver additional shares of common stock or 
Series B Preferred Stock to Whitewing for the amount that the market price of the 
converted Enron common shares is less than $28 per share. In 2000, Enron increased 
the strike price in the Share Settlement Agreement to $48.55 per share in exchange for 
an additional capital contribution in Whitewing by third-party investors.... Absent 
certain defaults or other specified events, Enron has the option to acquire the third­
party investors' interests. HEnron does not acquire the third-party investors' interests 
before January 2003, or earlier upon certain specified events, Whitewing may liqui­
date its assets and dissolve. (p. 43) 
Whitewing is one of Enron's 50 percent unconsolidated equity affiliates. 
This is but the tip of the iceberg. A separate disclosure note reveals (2000 
annual report, 42), "In 2000 and 1999, Enron sold approximately $632 mil­
lion and $192 million, respectively, of merchant investments and other assets 
to Whitewing. Enron recognized no gains or losses in connection with these 
transactions." This is but one of many very troubling and confusing disclo­
sures of intermingled "unconsolidated affiliate" disclosures. 
Revenue Analysis 
Revenue should only be recognized if Enron has provided all, or substan­
tially all, of the goods or services to the customer and if the customer with 
reasonable confidence is expected to pay cash. 
The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities 
The 2000 quarterly results show increasing and unprecedented levels of rev­
enue for each quarter. For example, revenues for the third quarter skyrocketed 
from $16.9 billion for the preceding quarter to $30 billion, a 77 percent increase. 
The fourth quarter shows revenues of $40.8 billion. A partial explanation is 
that unrealized gains resulting from "Assets from Price-Risk-Management 
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The Maintenance ofInvestor Confidence  andAccess to 
Financing Resources, and  Resultant Focus on Earnings per  
Share and  Components ofOther Key Financial  Ratios 
timeframeFootnote 7 of the1998 annual report (p. 55) delineates an important  
with regard to debt: "Enron has credit facilities with  domestic  and  foreign  
banks which provide for an aggregate of  $1.67 billion  in long-term  committed  
short-termcredit and $1.37 billion in  committed credit. Expiration dates  of  
the committed facilities range from April 1999 to June 2002....  Certain  credit  
facilities contain covenants which must be met to borrow  funds."s." From  this 
quote,  it is clear that continued financial success during this window  period is 
essential to the company's ability to maintain external financing. It provides a 
very  strong incentive for management to maintain the ratios stipulated in the 
debt covenants.  
In  the 2000  annual report, in the MD&A  (p. 27), management confirms this 
risk factor: "Enron  is party to certain financial contracts which contain provi­
sions  for  early  settlement  in the event of  a significant market price  decline  ...  
or  if  the credit ratings  for  Enron's  secured, senior long-term debt obligations 
fall below investment  grade....  Enron's  continued investment grade  status is 
critical to the success  of its wholesale businesses as well as its ability to main­
tain  adequate  liquidity."i idity." According  to  the 1998-2000  annual  reports, Enron 
consistently  maintained  its credit  ratings. But the possibility of  an understate­
ment  of liabilities  is a key consideration,  especially when favorable credit rat­
ings are  so critical  to the  firm's'  success.  
To get  a feel  for  long-term debt obligations, we summarize the disclosures on 
annual maturities oflong-term  debt outstanding for 1998 to 2000 (see table 5.2). 
In  the 2000 annual  report  (p. 41),  long-term  debt  due during 2001 rocketed 
to $2.1 billion, from $569  the year  before. The  sudden  escalation in the amount 
of  this debt is a major cause  for  concern,  especially  when  compared to prior 
year long-term debt levels. We will place  particular  emphasis  on this risk area 
when we do ratio analysis in the  financial  analysis  section. 
The Financial Success  ofInternational  High-Risk,  Hard-Asset  
Ventures and  Complex Partnership and  Equity  Ownership  
Structures 
Unconsolidated affiliates provide  management with the  opportunity  to un­
derstate liabilities. This topic  is fully investigated in  the  subsection  dealing  
with entity accounting  analysis, and it is a major area of  concern.  
In addition, Enron entered into complex  equity arrangements and commit­
ments,  and the related disclosures are confusing, to say the very least. The  
disclosure  in the 2000 annual  report illustrates the difficulties confronting  an 
analyst: 
I ~
Practical Financial Economics 88 
The Maintenance ofInvestor Confidence andAccess to 
Financing Resources, and Resultant Focus on Earnings per 
Share and Components ofOther Key Financial Ratios 
Footnote 7 of the1998 annual report (p. 55) delineates an important timeframe 
with regard to debt: "Enron has credit facilities with domestic and foreign 
banks which provide for an aggregate of $1.67 billion in long-term committed 
credit and $1.37 billion in short-term committed credit. Expiration dates of 
the committed facilities range from April 1999 to June 2002.... Certain credit 
facilities contain covenants which must be met to borrow funds." From this 
quote, it is clear that continued financial success during this window period is 
essential to the company's ability to maintain external financing. It provides a 
very strong incentive for management to maintain the ratios stipulated in the 
debt covenants. 
In the 2000 annual report, in the MD&A (p. 27), management confirms this 
risk factor: "Enron is party to certain financial contracts which contain provi­
sions for early settlement in the event of a significant market price decline ... 
or if the credit ratings for Enron's secured, senior long-term debt obligations 
fall below investment grade.... Enron's continued investment grade status is 
critical to the success of its wholesale businesses as well as its ability to main­
tain adequate liquidity." According to the 1998-2000 annual reports, Enron 
consistently maintained its credit ratings. But the possibility of an understate­
ment of liabilities is a key consideration, especially when favorable credit rat­
ings are so critical to the firm's success. 
To get a feel for long-term debt obligations, we summarize the disclosures on 
annual maturities oflong-term debt outstanding for 1998 to 2000 (see table 5.2). 
In the 2000 annual report (p. 41), long-term debt due during 2001 rocketed 
to $2.1 billion, from $569 the year before. The sudden escalation in the amount 
of this debt is a major cause for concern, especially when compared to prior 
year long-term debt levels. We will place particular emphasis on this risk area 
when we do ratio analysis in the financial analysis section. 
The Financial Success ofInternational High-Risk, Hard-Asset 
Ventures and Complex Partnership and Equity Ownership 
Structures 
Unconsolidated affiliates provide management with the opportunity to un­
derstate liabilities. This topic is fully investigated in the subsection dealing 
with entity accounting analysis, and it is a major area of concern. 
In addition, Enron entered into complex equity arrangements and commit­
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The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities 
If the broadband business segment proves to be unsuccessful, it could result 
in a write-off of a portion, or all, of the broadband assets of $1,313 million. 
The future profitability of this new business area, far removed from Enron's 
core area of expertise, is uncertain and risky, but we do not know enough to 
make any adjustments to the numbers. This possibility was discussed under 
the asset analysis. We also discussed unrealized losses resulting from trading 
in derivatives under asset analysis. 
The Maintenance ofInvestor Confidence andAccess to 
Financing Resources, and Resultant Focus on Earnings per 
Share and Components ofOther Key Financial Ratios 
Enron's focus on earnings per share leads us to consider the possible under­
statement of expenses, rather than overstatement. Specifically, we consider 
whether any reported assets should be expensed (e.g., goodwill and other in­
tangibles) and whether there are expenses that have been completely omitted 
(e.g., stock-option remuneration). We also look for large and unexpected asset 
write-offs, which may indicate management reluctance to incorporate chang­
ing business conditions into accounting estimates, especially if unfavorable to 
earnings per share (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-12). 
First, we consider "Goodwill" and "Other" assets (which are disclosed just 
below the goodwill line item). These are reported as follows. For Goodwill: 
1996, $0.87 billion; 1997 and 1998, $1.9 billion; 1999, $2.8 billion; 2000, 
$3.6 billion. For Other: 1996, $1.6 billion; 1997, $3.7 billion; 1998, $4.4 bil­
lion; 1999, $4.7 billion; 2000, $5.5 billion. These assets have increased pro­
gressively and form a substantial portion of total assets, but we have no way of 
estimating possible overstatements or impairments. It is unusual to see assets 
in the billions classified as "Other." We would like to see more disclosure on 
the nature of these assets. 
Next, we consider employee stock option expenses. Companies are not re­
quired to include employee stock-option expenses in net-income calculations, 
even though the expense can be material. This expense should appear on the 
income statement, but the Financial Accounting Standards Board bent to in­
tense corporate lobbying and political pressure and in 1995 released FASB 
Statement 123, which compromised by requesting that the expense be recorded 
but allowing it to be disclosed in the footnotes if the company wished, effec­
tively allowing for overstatement of net income and earnings per share. We 
are not surprised that Enron chose the footnote-disclosure route. Fortunately, 
FASB Statement 128 requires disclosure of diluted earnings per share, which 
includes the effects of unexercised options. Therefore, the reported impact of 
unexercised stock options (an unrecorded expense) can be estimated by exam­
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Activities" were included in "Other  Revenues" on the income statements, an 
issue addressed as part of  asset analysis. The cash-flow statements also show 
that merchant assets and investments generated unrealized gains. From a rev­
enue-recognition perspective, the issue revolves around the ability to eventu­
ally collect the cash related to unrealized gains, which management recorded 
as revenue. We choose to exclude these gains from revenues for purposes of  
financial analysis. 
The Maintenance ofInvestor Confidence andAccess to 
Financing Resources, and Resultant Focus on Earnings per  
Share and  Components ofOther Key Financial Ratios 
Management included revenues from unconsolidated equity affiliates (re­
lated parties) of $150 million in 2000, $674 million in 1999, $563 million in 
1998, and $219 million in 1997. We believe that these transactions should be  
eliminated on consolidation, and we will deal with this issue under entity ac­
counting analysis. However, we find an obvious contradiction and a very strong 
warning signal in wording that Enron uses in an explanatory small-print foot­
note to its reporting on "Unaffiliated Revenues" amounts: "Unaffiliated rev­
enues include sales to unconsolidated equity affiliates" (2000 annual report, 
51). Enron's  so-called unaffiliated revenues, which have shown a rampant 
increase, include non-arm's length sales to affiliates. Examples of  percentage 
holdings in these affiliates are Azurix Corp., Citrus Corp., Dabhol Power, and 
Teesside-lOOJEDI-all 50 percent; Jacare Electrical-51  percent; Enron I  
percent (disclosed in the 2000 annual report, 56). 
The Financial Success ofInternational High-Risk, Hard-Asset 
Ventures and  Complex Partnership and  Equity Ownership 
Structures 
By  consolidating unconsolidated equity affiliates (see Entity Accounting 
Analysis), we may be  able to partially undo revenue distortions with regard to 
this risk area. 
Expense  Analysis 
Reporting challenges related to expenses arise when resources provide ben­
efits over multiple accounting periods (e.g., goodwill), the timing and amount 
of future payments are uncertain (e.g., pension benefits); it is difficult to deter­
mine a value for resources consumed (e.g., stock option compensation) and the 
decline in value of  unused resources (e.g., asset impairments and changes in the 
value of financial instruments). Typically, we appeal to the matching and con­
servatism principles to arrive at a fair value (Palepu et al. 2000, 7-1 to 7-16). 
I! ' 
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The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities 
show 
If the broadband business segment proves to be unsuccessful, it could result 
in a write-off of a portion, or all, of the broadband assets of $1,313 million. 
The future profitability of this new business area, far removed from Enron's 
core area of expertise, is uncertain and risky, but we do not know enough to 
make any adjustments to the numbers. This possibility was discussed under 
the asset analysis. We also discussed unrealized losses resulting from trading 
in derivatives under asset analysis. 
The Maintenance ofInvestor Confidence andAccess to 
Financing Resources, and Resultant Focus on Earnings per 
Share and Components ofOther Key Financial Ratios 
in 
Enron's'  focus on earnings per share leads us to consider the possible under­
statement of expenses, rather than overstatement. Specifically, we consider 
whether any reported assets should be expensed (e.g., goodwill and other in­
tangibles) and whether there are expenses that have been completely omitted 
(e.g., stock-option remuneration). We also look for large and unexpected asset 
write-offs, which may indicate management reluctance to incorporate chang­
ing business conditions into accounting estimates, especially if unfavorable to 
earnings per share (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-12). 
First, we consider "Goodwill" and "Other" assets (which are disclosed just 
below the goodwill line item). These are reported as follows. For Goodwill: 
1996, $0.87 billion; 1997 and 1998, $1.9 billion; 1999, $2.8 billion; 2000, 
$3.6 billion. For Other: 1996, $1.6 billion; 1997, $3.7 billion; 1998, $4.4 bil­
lion; 1999, $4.7 billion; 2000, $5.5 billion. These assets have increased pro­
gressively and form a substantial portion of total assets, but we have no way of 
estimating possible overstatements or impairments. It is unusual to see assets 
in the billions classified as "Other." We would like to see more disclosure on 
the nature of these assets. 
Next, we consider employee stock option expenses. Companies are not re­
quired to include employee stock-option expenses in net-income calculations, 
even though the expense can be material. This expense should appear on the 
income statement, but the Financial Accounting Standards Board bent to in­
tense corporate lobbying and political pressure and in 1995 released FASB 
Statement 123, which compromised by requesting that the expense be recorded 
but allowing it to be disclosed in the footnotes if the company wished, effec­
tively allowing for overstatement of net income and earnings per share. We 
are not surprised that Enron chose the footnote-disclosure route. Fortunately, 
FASB Statement 128 requires disclosure of diluted earnings per share, which 
includes the effects of unexercised options. Therefore, the reported impact of 
exam­unexercised stock options (an unrecorded expense) can be estimated by 
I 
Financial Analysts and Enron 93 
Enron purposely structured its holdings to be exactly at 50 percent mainly to 
avoid consolidation? Some of the unconsolidated affiliates even exceed the 
rule-of-thumb limit of 50 percent. For example, on December 31, 1998, Enron's 
ownership interest in one unconsolidated affiliate, Enron Teesside Operations, 
was 100 percent. Enron's position is that it intended to ultimately hold a vot­
ing interest of no more than 50 percent and therefore chooses not to consoli­
date. We beg to differ. 
Asset-heavy Dabhol Power Company and Wessex Water are included in 
these unconsolidated affiliates, along with the JEDI and JEDI II and other 
partnerships. Enron states in the footnote that it has also entered into various 
arms-length administrative service, management, construction, supply, and 
operating agreements with these affiliates, but based on the percentage hold­
ings, we discount this assertion. The footnotes include a summary balance 
sheet of all the affiliates combined. In our adjustments, we will use the infor­
mation obtained from the financial statements and shown in table 5.3 to con­
solidate these affiliates. This affects not only asset balances but also liabilities, 
shareholders' equity, and net income for 1996 to 2000. 
Table 5.3� 
Financial Information for Unconsolidated Equity Affiliates (In Millions of U.S.� 
Dollars)� 
2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 
Investment in Affiliates 5,294 5,036 4,433 2,656 1,701
-_.__._.__._.,-.._-.-
Eguity in Earnings (Losses) 87 309 97 216 215 
- .-- ..-._._._-_ ..,.._--­
--_._------------­
Balance Sheet 
Current Assets 5,884' 3,168' 2,309' 3,611 2,587 
Property, Plant & Equipment (net) 14,786 14,356 12,640 8,851 8,064 
Other Non-Current Assets 13,485 9,459 7,176 1,089 902 
Current Liabilities 4,739b 4,401 b 3,501 b 1,861 h 2,381 
Long-Term Debt 9,717h 8,486b 7,621 h 5,694h 5,230 
Other Non-Current Liabilities 6,148 2,402 2,016 1,295 1,139 
Owners' Equity 13,551 11,694 8,987 4,701 2,803 
Income Statement C 
Operating Revenues 15,903 11,568 8,508 11,183 8,258 
Operating Expenses 14,710 9,449 7,244 10,246 7,335 
Net Income 586 1,857 142 336 226 
Distributions Paid to Enron 137 482 87 118 68 
Source: Notes to the Financial Statements in 1998, 1999, and 2000 annual reports; 1997 Form� 
1O-K.� 
'Includes Receivables from Enron: 2000, $410 million; 1999, $327 million; 1998, $196 million.� 
bIncludes Payables to Enron: 2000, $302 million; 1999, $84 million; 1998, $296 million;� 
1997, $569 million.� 
'Enron recognized revenues from transactions with unconsolidated equity affiliates: 2000,� 
$510 million; 1999, $674 million; 1998, $563 million; 1997, $219 million.� 
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iningi i  thet  mandatoryt  reconciliationili ti  betweent  basici  and  dilutedil t  earningsr i  per  
share.. The  impacti tof includingi l i  thist i  stockt optionti expense  isi  a decreaser ini  after­ft
taxt  nett incomei  as follows:ll : 2000,, $93 million;illi ; 1999,, $66  million;illi ; 1998,, $29  
million;illi ; 1997,, $39  million;illi ; and  1996,, $22 million.illi . 
The  Financial  Success  ofInternational  High-Risk,  Hard-Assett 
Ventures and  Complex  Partnership  and  Equity  Ownership  
Structures  
The  MD&A  (2000  annual  report,  21)  mentions  a  $326  millioni  impairmentt 
charge  for  Azurix,  a  water  and  wastewater  "unconsolidatedi t  equity  affiliate"  
and  one of Enron's'  new ventures.  This  impairment  is not  separately  disclosed  
on thet  face of  thet  incomei  statement.  We cannot  determine  whether  further  
impairmentsi i t  are likely. 
By  consolidating  unconsolidated  equity  affiliates  (see  Entity-Accountingti  
Analysis),  we may be able tot  partially undo distortions with  regard  to this 
expense risk  area. 
Another  problem  we experienced is the lack  of disclosure on  foreign  assets. 
We were unable to determine whether the reported value of  foreign  assets 
could be impaired.  
Entity-AccountingAnalysis  
Entity-accounting  analysis  is crucial  in determining reporting boundaries 
for financial analysis  purposes.  The  focus is on resources that an entity con­
trols in evaluating  performance rather  than  on legal  definitions of control. The 
accounting challenge is whether to aggregate the financial performance of  
two or more reporting entities (see Palepu et  al. 2000, 8-1). Enron has a com­
plex and confusing myriad of related unconsolidated affiliates and related par­
ties. A convolution of  financing and other  arrangements, combined with 
bewildering disclosures, make this a difficult and troubling area to examine. 
The Financial Success ofInternational  High-Risk, Hard-Asset 
Ventures and  Complex Partnership and  Equity  Ownership 
Structures 
42--43)Footnote 9 (2000 annual report, -  makes warning bells go off. Enron's 
unconsolidated equity affiliates are mostly 50 percent holdings. Are we to 
believe that a company of Enron's size, stature, and aggressiveness does not 
exercise control over these affiliates? This is especially pertinent when we 
consider the power that Enron management appears to exert over financial 
analysts. In addition, Enron guarantees the performance, liabilities, and lease 
obligations of some these affiliates to the tune of over $2.5 billion. Is this the 
action of  a third party without control over these entities? Is it possible that 
I 
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obligations of some these affiliates to the tune of over $2.5 billion. Is this the
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Enron purposely structured its holdings to be exactly at 50 percent mainly to 
avoid consolidation? Some of the unconsolidated affiliates even exceed the 
rule-of-thumb limit of 50 percent. For example, on December 31, 1998, Enron's'  
ownership interest in one unconsolidated affiliate, Enron Teesside Operations, 
was 100 percent. Enron's'  position is that it intended to ultimately hold a vot­
ing interest of no more than 50 percent and therefore chooses not to consoli­
date. We beg to differ. 
Asset-heavy Dabhol Power Company and Wessex Water are included in 
these unconsolidated affiliates, along with the JEDI and JEDI II and other 
partnerships.. Enron states in the footnote that it has also entered into various 
arms-length administrative service, management, construction, supply, and 
operating agreements with these affiliates, but based on the percentage hold­
ings, we discount this assertion. The footnotes include a summary balance 
sheet of all the affiliates combined. In our adjustments, we will use the infor­
mation obtained from the financial statements and shown in table 5.3 to con­
solidate these affiliates. This affects not only asset balances but also liabilities, 
shareholders'' equity, and net income for 1996 to 2000. 
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Table 5.4 
Enron's Relationships between Income, Cash Flows, and Taxes (US. Dollar 
Amounts in Millions) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1. Net Income $584 $105* $703 $893 $979 
Cash Flow from Operations $884 $211 $1,640 $1,228 $4,779 
% Net Income to Cash Flow 69% 50% 43% 73% 15% 
2. Income before Income Taxes $855 $15* $878 $1,128 $1,413 
Tax Payable on Income 64 84 88 83 227 
% Tax Payable 7.5'10 560% 10.1% 7.4% 16.1°/', 
% Deferred Tax 24.2% (1160%) 9.9% 1.8% 14.6% 
% Effective Tax 31.7% (600%) 20% 9.2% 30.7% 
*Includes unusual nonrecurring contract restructuring charge of $675 million. 
We also scrutinize the 1998 to 2000 annual reports for evidence of large 
fourth quarter fluctuations, as annual reports are audited, whereas quarterly 
reports are (normally) merely reviewed (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-12). Manage­
ment could make adjustments in the fourth quarter to satisfy the external audi­
tors; this would heighten our concern about the credibility of the numbers. We 
do notice an anomaly during the fourth quarter of 2000. Revenues increased 
by 36 percent over the third quarter, and yet net income decreased by 79 per­
cent. We now feel even more comfortable with our decision to make adjust­
ments to revenues. 
Undoing Perceived Accounting Distortions 
Before proceeding to financial analysis, we will undo accounting distor­
tions as we believe warranted, based on our accounting analysis interpreta­
tions. We had additional concerns, but we do not have enough information to 
quantify and adjust for them. The adjustments we decided on for financial 
analysis purposes are as follows: 
Possible unrealized gains from price risk management activities (included in "Other 
Revenues" on the income statement): Restate revenues (and net income before tax) 
for 1999 and 2000, and reduce Retained Earnings. Income before tax decreases 
materially as follows: 2000, $763 million; and 1999, $395 million. "Assets from 
price risk management activities" decreases as well, to complete the double entry. 
We also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate. 
Possible unrealized gains on merchant assets and investments: Reduce revenues (and 
net income before tax) and "Other Assets" as follows: 2000, $1,295 million; 1999, 
$827 million; 1998, $721 million; 1997, $308 million; and 1996, $192 million. We 
also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate. 
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Another  footnote  of  interest,  "Related  Party  Transactions," appears  for  the  
first  time  in  the  1999  annual  report  (p. 59).  A  major  concern  is that  these  
transactions  may  lack  the objectivity  of the free  market  and  consequently  have  
the  potential  to materially  distort  financial  information.  Extracts  from  Enron's'  
footnote  include:  "In  June  1999, Enron  entered  into  a  series  of  transactions  
involving a third party  and LJM  Cayman.... A senior officer of  Enron  is the 
managing  member  of  LJM's  general partner"; "An officer  of  Enron  has in­
vested in  the limited partner of  JEDI  and from time to time acts as agent on 
behalf  of  the limited partner's  management." The  thirty-seven lines of  related 
party  disclosure in  1999 increase to ninety lines in  2000, indicating increased 
activity in this area. The proxy statement for the 2001 shareholders' meeting 
(available around the time of  the release of the 2000 annual report) identifies 
the senior official as Andrew Fastow, Enron's chief financial officer. The lim­
ited partner is unknown. The footnote goes on to describe some of  the related 
party transactions and discloses pretax gains for Enron of  approximately $16 
million, which is not material. However, in 2000, the related party footnote 
more than doubles in length (2000 annual report, 48-49). It starts as follows: 
"In 2000 and 1999, Enron entered into transactions with limited partnerships 
(the Related Party) whose general partner's managing partner is a senior offi­
cial of Enron." The pretax effects on net income from transactions with these 
partnerships appear to be in excess of $550 million. This is a substantial por­
tion of Enron's pretax earnings of $1,413. This raises serious questions about 
the quality of earnings. Ideally, our consolidation adjustments for unconsoli­
dated affiliates will adjust for these transactions, but we are not given enough 
information to be completely confident. 
Consolidation ofthese unconsolidated affiliates increases Enron's reported 
debt equity ratio at December 31, 2000, by almost 40 percent, which could 
result in violation of debt covenants. This ratio will be discussed in more de­
tail when we perform the detailed financial analysis. 
Additional Red flags 
In addition to the concerns already raised, we review the relationships be­
tween Enron's'  reported net income and cash flow from operating activities 
and its reported net income before taxes and taxable income. 
Table 5.4.  clearly shows large and inconsistent fluctuations between net in­
come and operating cash flow (especially in 2000),, as well as enormous dif­
ferences in reported net income (before taxes) and taxable income.. This is an 
indication that quality of earnings may not be high.. In particular,, the large gap 
between 2000 net income of $979 million and cash generated by operations of 
$4,779,  requiresr ir  morer  explanation.l ti . IsI  itit possiblei l  thatt t cash flowfl  fromfr  investingi ti  
activitiesti iti  was divertedi rt  tot  cash flowfl  fromfr  operatingr ti  activities?ti iti  We have alreadylr  
putt forthf rt  an argumentr t forf r thist i  ini  regardr r  tot  noncurrentrr t price-risk-managementri -ri - t 
activities.ti iti . 
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by 36 percent over the third quarter, and yet net income decreased by 79 per­
cent. We now feel even more comfortable with our decision to make adjust­
ments to revenues. 
Undoing Perceived Accounting Distortions 
Before proceeding to financial analysis, we will undo accounting distor­
tions as we believe warranted, based on our accounting analysis interpreta­
tions. We had additional concerns, but we do not have enough information to 
quantify and adjust for them. The adjustments we decided on for financial 
analysis purposes are as follows: 
Possible unrealized gains from price risk management activities (included in "Other 
Revenues" on the income statement): Restate revenues (and net income before tax) 
for 1999 and 2000, and reduce Retained Earnings. Income before tax decreases 
materially as follows: 2000, $763 million; and 1999, $395 million. "Assets from 
price risk management activities" decreases as well, to complete the double entry. 
We also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate. 
Possible unrealized gains on merchant assets and investments: Reduce revenues (and 
net income before tax) and "Other Assets" as follows: 2000, $1,295 million; 1999, 
$827 million; 1998, $721 million; 1997, $308 million; and 1996, $192 million. We 
also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate. 
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TableS.S 
Enron Ratio Analysis after Adjustments to Reported Amounts 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Return on Equity 12.2% -3% 3.5% 0.4% -4.9% 
Return on Assets 1.7% -0.5%. 0.5% 0.1% -0.6% 
Financial Leverage 7.2 6.5 6.6 6.6 7.9 
Net Profit Margin 2% -0.4% 0.5% 0.1% -0.4% 
Asset Turnover 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.6 
Gross Profit Margin 6.5% 4.1% 4.9% 4.1% 0.8% 
Basic EPS 0.86 -0.28 0.29 -0.05 -0.73 
Net PP&E Turnover 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.1 4.4 
Current Ratio 1.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.1 
Debt Equity Ratio 5.7 4.5 5.0 4.2 7.2 
tionally generated ROEs of 11 to 13 percent (paIepu et aI. 2000, 9-3). Emon's ROEs 
are: 2000, minus 4.6 percent; 1999,0.4 percent; 1998,3.2 percent; 1997, mi­
nus 2.5 percent; and 1996, 12.2 percent. The return for 1996 is the only one 
that is within the normal range. The subsequent years (1997 to 2000) are well 
below this range, with 2000 being the worst year by far. Problems with overall 
profitability appear to surface as early as 1997. A review of a Reed Wasden 
Research publication (Wasden et a1. 2001,2-8) shows that Emon's ROEs (even 
the preadjustment ROE) fall far short of those of its comparable peers-AES, 
Calpine, Constellation, Duke, Dynegy, TXU, and Williams Companies. For 
example, peer 2000 ROEs were 17.21 percent, 20.21 percent, 10.6 percent, 
13.5 percent, 19.29 percent, 11.3 percent, and 9.14 percent, respectively. Even 
Emon's preadjustment ROE of 7 percent is the lowest for this group. Yet, as 
the report indicates (Wasden et a1. 2001, 2), Emon was trading at a substantial 
valuation premium over its peers. 
A further decomposition of ROE can be done, into return on assets or ROA 
(Net Income/Average Assets) to determine how profitably assets have been 
employed and financial leverage (Average Assets/Average Shareholders' Eq­
uity), which shows how big the firm's asset base is relative to shareholder 
investment. Enron's ROAs are 2000, minus 0.5 percent; 1999,0.06 percent; 
1998, 0.4 percent; 1997, minus 0.4 percent; and 1996, 1.7 percent. An already 
low ROA declined sharply from 1996 to 1997 and has remained at extremely 
low or negative levels. Ratios for the peer group ranged between 2.45 and 
5.37 for the 2000 fiscal year. 
Financial leverage ratios, which show how many dollars of assets the firm 
deploys for each dollar of shareholder investment, were fairly constant, ex­
cept for the increase shown during the 2000 fiscal year: 2000,9.3; 1999,6.2; 
1998, 7.1; 1997,6.1; 1996, 7.2. The main problem appears to be with the 
ROA factor of ROE. 
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Adjustmentt t forr impacti tof stockt optionti expenses ass a decreaser ini  after-taxt r-ta  nett incomei  as 
follows:ll : 2000,, $93  million;lli ; 1999,, $66  million;illi ; 1998,, $29  million;li ; 1997,, $39  mil­l­
lion;li ; and  1996,, $22  million.lli . 
Consolidatei t  unconsolidatedli t  affiliatesffili tes as besttwe  can  witht  thet  incompletei l t  informationi f r ti  
availableil l  tot  us  (see(s  tablet l  5.3).. . Ourr consolidatedli t  financiali i l informationi r ti  isi  subjectj t tot  
the  following  limitations:ti : we have only  aggregated  amounts  for  all affiliates; we  do 
not  have  individuali i i  affiliateli t  ownership  interest  percentages,, acquisitioni  dates,, 
amounts,, and preacquisitioni  equity  information;  and  we  do not have  the breakdown  
of revenues  and expenses  thatt  are not operating  revenues/expenses  and  cannott splitlit 
these  expenses  between  interest,, income  tax,, and other  expenses  or  revenues.. Be­­
cause  of  thet  above limitations,li t ti , assets  may  be understated,, because  we  couldl  nott 
determinet  at-acquisitioni  goodwill.. We achieve  duality  by adjustingti  the  reportedt  
amount  for Minority  Interests.. 
FINANCIAL  ANALYSIS  
Overviewi  of  Financial Analysisl  
The purpose  of  financial  analysis is to  assess  the  performance  of  the firm. 
We use two tools for this purpose:  ratio  analysis  and cash flow analysis. In 
ratio analysis, we determine how  selected financial  statement line items relate 
to each other, and we assess  the  firm's'  profitability.  In cash flow analysis, we 
analyze liquidity and evaluate  cash flows from operating, investing, and fi­
nancing activities (Palepu  et  al. 2000,  9-1). 
Our  financial analysis  is somewhat  limited by a lack  of  information on  the 
unconsolidated  affiliates.  For  example, we do not have the details of  interest 
expense, income  tax expense, and cash flow for these affiliates. Therefore, we 
could not calculate the ratios that require this information (e.g., Earnings be­
1  
PaIepu a1.fore Income Tax margins), and consequently we could not use the l et  l  
fmancial(2000, 9-1 to 9-29) financial analysis model in its entirety. Although our in  
analysis may not be as comprehensive as we would like it to be, we believe that 
the key ratios that we could calculate provide us with enough information to make 
an informed decision about Emon's financial results and  condition. 
Ratio Analysis 
The ratios that we use for our personal  decision-making purposes  are sum­
marized in table 5.5. These calculations are based the adjusted amounts that 
Emon'swe calculated, not on nr  reported amounts. Where relevant, we use the 
average of the beginning and ending balances for assets, liabilities, and share­
holders' equity in our ratio calculations. The only exception to this is for 1996, 
because we do not have adjusted amounts for 1995. 
The starting point for analyzing a firm's profitability is return on equity. 
ROE indicates how well management has used shareholders' funding to gen­
havetradi­erate returns. On average, over long periods, large public U.S. firms 
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Adjustment for impact of stock option expense as a decrease in after-tax net income a
follows: 2000, $93 million; 1999, $66 million; 1998, $29 million; 1997, $39 mil
lion; and 1996, $22 million. 
Consolidate unconsolidated affiliates as best we can with the incomplete informatio
available to us (see table 5.3). Our consolidated financial information is subject t
the following limitations: we have only aggregated amounts for all affiliates; we d
not have individual affiliate ownership interest percentages, acquisition dates
amounts, and preacquisition equity information; and we do not have the breakdow
of revenues and expenses that are not operating revenues/expenses and cannot spli
these expenses between interest, income tax, and other expenses or revenues. Be
cause of the above limitations, assets may be understated, because we could no
determine at-acquisition goodwill. We achieve duality by adjusting the reporte
amount for Minority Interests. 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
Overview of Financial Analysis 
The purpose of financial analysis is to assess the performance of the firm
We use two tools for this purpose: ratio analysis and cash flow analysis. I
ratio analysis, we determine how selected financial statement line items relat
to each other, and we assess the firm's profitability. In cash flow analysis, w
analyze liquidity and evaluate cash flows from operating, investing, and fi
nancing activities (Palepu et a1. 2000, 9-1). 
, Our financial analysis is somewhat limited by a lack of information on th
unconsolidated affiliates. For example, we do not have the details of interes
expense, income tax expense, and cash flow for these affiliates. Therefore, w
could not calculate the ratios that require this information (e.g., Earnings be
fore Income Tax margins), and consequently we could not use the PaIepu et a1
(2000, 9-1 to 9-29) financial analysis model in its entirety. Although our fmancia
analysis may not be as comprehensive as we would like it to be, we believe tha
the key ratios that we could calculate provide us with enough information to mak
an informed decision about Emon's financial results and condition. 
Ratio Analysis 
The ratios that we use for our personal decision-making purposes are sum
marized in table 5.5. These calculations are based the adjusted amounts tha
we calculated, not on Emon's reported amounts. Where relevant, we use th
average of the beginning and ending balances for assets, liabilities, and share
holders' equity in our ratio calculations. The only exception to this is for 1996
because we do not have adjusted amounts for 1995. 
The starting point for analyzing a firm's profitability is return on equity
ROE indicates how well management has used shareholders' funding to gen
erate returns. On average, over long periods, large public U.S. firms havetradi
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TableS.S
Enron Ratio Analysis after Adjustments to Reported Amounts
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Return on Equity 12.2% -3% 3.5% 0.4% -4.9% 
Return on Assets -0.5%. 0.5% 0.1% -0.6%1.7% .5'Y.
Financial Leverage 7.2.  6.5 6.6 6.6 7.9 
Net Profit Margin 2% -0.4% 0.5% 0.1% -0.4% 
Asset Turnover 0.8.  1.1 1.0 1.0 1.6 
Gross Profit Margin 6.5% 4.1% 4.9% 4.1% 0.8% 
Basic EPS 0.86 -0.28 0.29 -0.05 -0.73 
Net PP&E Turnover 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.1 4.4 
Current Ratio 1.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.1 
Debt Equity Ratio 5.7 4.5 5.0 4.2 7.2 
Emon'stionally generated ROEs of 11 to 13 percent (paIepu et aI. 2000, 9-3). nr  ROEs
are: 2000, minus 4.6 percent; 1999,0.4 percent; 1998,3.2 percent; 1997, mi­
nus 2.5 percent; and 1996, 12.2 percent. The return for 1996 is the only one
that is within the normal range. The subsequent years (1997 to 2000) are well
below this range, with 2000 being the worst year by far. Problems with overall
profitability appear to surface as early as 1997. A review of a Reed Wasden
a1.Research publication (Wasden et l. 2001,2-8) shows that Emon's ROEs (even
the preadjustment ROE) fall far short of those of its comparable peers-AES,
Calpine, Constellation, Duke, Dynegy, TXU,, and Williams Companies. For
example, peer 2000 ROEs were 17.21 percent,, 20.21 percent, 10.6 percent,
13.5 percent, 19.29 percent, 11.3 percent,, and 9.14 percent, respectively. Even
Emon's preadjustment ROE of 7 percent is the lowest for this group. Yet, as
a1.the report indicates (Wasden et l. 2001, 2), Emon was trading at a substantial
valuation premium over its peers.
A further decomposition of ROE can be done, into return on assets or ROA
(Net Income/Average Assets) to determine how profitably assets have been
employed and financial leverage (Average Assets/Average Shareholders' Eq­
uity), which shows how big the firm's asset base is relative to shareholder
investment.. Enron's'  ROAs are 2000, minus 0.5 percent; 1999,0.06 percent;
1998, 0.4 percent; 1997, minus 0.4 percent; and 1996, 1.7 percent. An already
low ROA declined sharply from 1996 to 1997 and has remained at extremely
low or negative levels. Ratios for the peer group ranged between 2.45 and
5.37 for the 2000 fiscal year. 
Financial leverage ratios, which show how many dollars of assets the firm
deploys for each dollar of shareholder investment, were fairly constant, ex­
cept for the increase shown during the 2000 fiscal year: 2000,9.3; 1999,6.2;
1998, 7.1; 1997,6.1; 1996, 7.2. The main problem appears to be with the
ROA factor of ROE.
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lion) and cash flow from operating activities ($4,779 million) for the 2000 
fiscal year, a difference of $3.8 billion. In contrast, the difference for 1999 
was a mere $335 million. Also, net cash from operating activities increased by 
$3,551, or 289 percent, in 2000. Enron's management explains this enormous 
difference as "primarily reflecting decreases in working capital, positive oper­
ating results and a receipt of cash associated with the assumption of a contrac­
tual obligation" (2000 annual report, 26). Our concern is that cash flow from 
investing activities (e.g., sale of investment assets) may have been diverted to 
cash flow from operating activities. Proceeds from the sale of merchant assets 
and investments are recorded at $1,838 million. We also notice an amount of 
$1,113 million cash inflow, described as "Other operating activities." The com­
parative amount for 1999 was a mere $174 million. Is this the contractual 
obligation of which management briefly makes mention? What is the nature 
of this obligation? Should this obligation possibly be better classified as a 
financing activity? We do not have the answers to these questions, but we do 
not feel comfortable with the cash flow disclosures. We would like to see 
more of an explanation from management, because of the materiality of the 
difference between net income and cash flow from operating activities. If this 
business generated this much in cash from operations, why is the current ratio 
so low and the debt equity ratio so high at the end of 2000? 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analyses, we would not recommend this stock. From 
1997 onwards, our analyses indicate reporting and performance problems. We 
have major concerns about profitability and debt levels. 
Enron throws an abundance of information at financial analysts in its Form 
lO-K filings (which are generally in excess of 200 pages). The language is not 
always clear; it can be downright confusing, even to accounting experts-a 
major red flag in and of itself. The quantity of information makes the analyst's 
job time consuming and tedious, effectively drowning the analyst in paper, 
and yet essential information (e.g., separate disclosures of unrealized gains on 
trading activities) is not available. Nonetheless, this does not excuse those 
analysts who overwhelmingly would not see the woods for the trees and who 
continued recommending to clients that they buy or hold Enron stock. 
Our investigation shows that the red flags were plentiful, and the situation 
was aggravated by the apparent disdain Gudging by incidents reported in the 
news media) with which Enron's top management dealt with financial analysts. 
Coupled with the results of our accounting and financial analyses, we should be 
very concerned about the competence, independence, and objectivity of financial 
analysts who continued to recommend this stock. This raises the question of 
whether these analysts were remiss in the discharge of their fiduciary duties. 
We posit that financial analysts may have been buying into the mindset of 
financial management, if one believes that the pre-Enron CFO literature re­
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ROA can be further decomposed into Net Income/Sales multiplied by Sales/ 
Average Assets, the net profit margin and asset turnover ratios, respectively 
(see table 5.5). Enron's profit margins are dismal, dropping from 2 percent in 
1996 to -0.4  percent in 1997 and 2000. The two positive returns of 0.5 percent 
and 0.1 percent in 1998 and 1999 are well below those of  six of Enron's seven 
peers. Comparative peer ratios for 2000 were: 9.58 percent, 16.32 percent, 8.9 
percent, 3.6 percent, 1.70 percent, 4.78 percent, and 5.19 percent (Wasden et 
al. 2001, 8). The asset turnover ratio appears to be reasonable, given the heavy 
asset investment requirements that are characteristic ofenergy companies. Once 
again, profitability appears to be problematic. Gross profit margins (calcu­
lated  with limited information as follow: [Operating Revenues - Operating 
Costs and  Expenses]/Operating Revenues) indicate a problem in 2000. The 
ratios remained fairly constant from 1997 to 1999 but then dropped from 4.1 
percent in 1999 to 0.8 percent in  2000, despite an increase of  129 percent in 
the amount of operating revenue from 1999 to 2000. In summary, we are con­
cerned about Enron's operating management. Restated earnings per share 
strongly reinforce our  concerns (1997, from 0.16 to negative 0.28; 1998, from 
1.07 to 0.29; 1999, from 1.17 to negative 0.05; and 2000, from 1.22 to nega­
tive 0.73). How do these deteriorating profit ratios justify the increase in stock 
price of  nearly 90 percent in 2000? 
With regard to long-term asset management, the only ratio that we could 
calculate was the property, plant & equipment (PP&E) turnover ratio (Sales/ 
Average Net PP&E), which shows the efficiency with which PP&E was used. 
The only major fluctuation that we noted was the increase in this ratio from 
2.1 in 1999 to 4.4 in  2000, a result of  the dramatic increase in operating rev­
enues in 2000, without a comparable increase in PP&E. As previously dis­
cussed, we opine that the 2000 revenues are of questionable quality. 
Finally, we evaluate financial management. Enron' current ratio (current 
assetslcurrent/  liabilities) appears to be consistently low, ranging between 0.9 
and 1.4 for 1996 to 2000. From  a debt and long-term solvency perspective, 
our concerns center round the vastly deteriorating debt equity ratio in 2000. 
Our restated consolidated amounts indicate an increase in the debt equity ratio 
from 4.2 in 1999 to 7.2 in 2000. Also, reported debt/equity and restated debt/ 
equity showed a deterioration of close to 40 percent. This, along with earnings 
management concerns, does not inspire investment confidence. 
However, we will analyze Enron's cash flow numbers before reaching to a 
final conclusion. 
Cash Flow Analysis 
We do not have the required unconsolidated equity information to adjust 
Enron's reported cash-flow information. Therefore, we will perform certain 
aspects of  cash-flow analysis based on reported amounts. We are particularly 
interested in the large gap between Enron's reported net income ($979 mil-­
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ROA can be further decomposed into Net Income/Sales multiplied by Sales/
Average Assets, the net profit margin and asset turnover ratios, respectively
(see table 5.5). Enron's profit margins are dismal, dropping from 2 percent in
1996 to -0.4 percent in 1997 and 2000. The two positive returns of 0.5 percent
and 0.1 percent in 1998 and 1999 are well below those of six of Enron's seven
peers. Comparative peer ratios for 2000 were: 9.58 percent, 16.32 percent, 8.9
percent, 3.6 percent, 1.70 percent, 4.78 percent, and 5.19 percent (Wasden et
al. 2001, 8). The asset turnover ratio appears to be reasonable, given the heavy
asset investment requirements that are characteristic ofenergy companies. Once
again, profitability appears to be problematic. Gross profit margins (calcu­
lated with limited information as follow: [Operating Revenues - Operating
Costs and Expenses]/Operating Revenues) indicate a problem in 2000. The
ratios remained fairly constant from 1997 to 1999 but then dropped from 4.1 
percent in 1999 to 0.8 percent in 2000, despite an increase of 129 percent in
the amount of operating revenue from 1999 to 2000. In summary, we are con­
cerned about Enron's operating management. Restated earnings per share
strongly reinforce our concerns (1997, from 0.16 to negative 0.28; 1998, from
1.07 to 0.29; 1999, from 1.17 to negative 0.05; and 2000, from 1.22 to nega­
tive 0.73). How do these deteriorating profit ratios justify the increase in stock
price of nearly 90 percent in 2000? 
With regard to long-term asset management, the only ratio that we could
calculate was the property, plant & equipment (PP&E) turnover ratio (Sales/
Average Net PP&E), which shows the efficiency with which PP&E was used.
The only major fluctuation that we noted was the increase in this ratio from
2.1 in 1999 to 4.4 in 2000, a result of the dramatic increase in operating rev­
enues in 2000, without a comparable increase in PP&E. As previously dis­
cussed, we opine that the 2000 revenues are of questionable quality. 
Finally, we evaluate financial management. Enron' current ratio (current
assetslcurrent liabilities) appears to be consistently low, ranging between 0.9
and 1.4 for 1996 to 2000. From a debt and long-term solvency perspective,
our concerns center round the vastly deteriorating debt equity ratio in 2000. 
Our restated consolidated amounts indicate an increase in the debt equity ratio
from 4.2 in 1999 to 7.2 in 2000. Also, reported debt/equity and restated debt/
equity showed a deterioration of close to 40 percent. This, along with earnings
management concerns, does not inspire investment confidence. 
However, we will analyze Enron's cash flow numbers before reaching to a
final conclusion. 
Cash Flow Analysis 
We do not have the required unconsolidated equity information to adjust
Enron's reported cash-flow information. Therefore, we will perform certain
aspects of cash-flow analysis based on reported amounts. We are particularly
interested in the large gap between Enron's reported net income ($979 mil-
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lion)lion)andandcashcashflowflow fromfrom operatingoperatingactivitiesactivities ($4,779($4,779 million)i lion) forfor thethe20002000 
afiscalfiscal year,year, adifferencedi ferenceofof$3.8$3.8 billion.bi lion. InIncontrast,contrast, thethedifferencedi ferenceforfor 19991999 
awaswas amereere$335$335million.i lion.Also,Also,netnetcashcashfromfro operatingoperatingactivitiesactivitiesincreasedincreasedbyby 
$3,551,$3,551,oror289289percent,percent,inin2000.2000.Enron'sEnron'smanagementanage entexplainsexplainsthisthisenormousenor ous 
differencedifferenceasas"primarily"pri arilyreflectingreflectingdecreasesdecreasesininworkingorkingcapital,capital,positivepositiveoper­oper­
atingatingresultsresultsandandaareceiptreceiptofofcashcashassociatedassociatedwithiththetheassumptionassu ptionofofaacontrac­contrac­
tualtualobligation"obligation" (2000(2000annualannualreport,report, 26).26).Oururconcernconcernisis thatthatcashcashflowflo  fromfro  
investinginvestingactivitiesactivities (e.g.,(e.g., salesaleofofinvestmentinvest entassets)assets)maya  haveave beeneendiverteddiverte toto 
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parativer ti  amountt forf r 1999  wass a  merer  $174  million.illi . IsIs thist is thet  contractualtr t l 
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financingfi i  activity?  We do not  have  the answers  to  these questions,, but  we do 
not  feel  comfortable  with  the cash  flow disclosures.  We would  like  to  see 
more  of  an  explanation  from  management,  because  of  the materiality  of  the 
difference  between net income and cash flow from operating activities. If this 
business generated this much in cash from operations, why is the current ratio 
so low and the debt equity ratio so high at the end of 2000? 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analyses, we would not recommend this stock. From 
1997 onwards, our analyses indicate reporting and performance problems. We 
have major concerns about profitabilitylit  and debt levels. 
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flects what was happening within financial management circles. When re­
viewing this literature, bear in mind that the purpose of financial reporting is 
to reflect underlying business reality so that external users can make informed 
economic decisions. We conclude this chapter with examples from this litera­
ture, which was freely available to financial analysts. 
Ronald Fink, a senior editor of CFO Magazine, wrote about Enron's sub­
stantial need for capital in June 1999: "But conventional financing techniques 
to exploit the industry's current and potential size would jeopardize the BBB+ 
credit rating Enron earns.... The financial balancing act that this situation 
requires has turned Enron into a master of creative financing.... Enron does 
highlynot consolidate a number of leveraged subsidiaries in which it owns­
or plans to own-no more than 50 percent of the voting stock. Under current 
practice, Enron can use the equity method of treating these subsidiaries' re­
sults, which keeps their debt and assets off Enron's own books." The article 
goes on to describe the "creative financing" that Fastow used to keep some 
$10 billion in long-term debt and other liabilities off Enron's balance sheet. 
The writer concludes: "No wonder Fastow goes to great lengths to convince 
financial analysts that such nonrecourse debt shouldn't be consolidated, re­
gardless of FASB's position." A second article appears in the same publica­
tion in October 1999 (Banham 1999), singing Fastow's praises for "walking 
the tightrope" of  creative financing: "Fastow's expert balancing act, in fact, 
has earned him this year's CFO Excellence Award for Capital Structure Man­
agement." The very acts that resulted in this Excellence Award are contrary to 
the purpose of financial accounting, which is to help external decision makers 
make informed decisions about the economic activities of the firm. I 
NOTE 
1. Enron's employee evaluation/incentive system that provided high rewards for 
good short-term performance reports and termination for the bottom 15 percent "per­
manipUlationformers" certainly created a fertile environment for accounting ul  and dis­
torted reports (Cruver 2002). This fact must be taken into consideration for any firm 
having or considering such a system. 
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